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THE RIGHTS OF THE INNOCENT ARRESTEE:
SEALING OF RECORDS UNDER CALIFORNIA
PENAL CODE SECTION 851.8
Introduction: The Extent of the Evil
The Lingering Threat in an Arrest Record
Consider the predicament of an innocent person who finds himself
arrested and charged with committing a crime which he in fact did not
commit. Perhaps he was in the wrong place at the wrong time: wait-
ing for a friend in a park late at night.' Perhaps no crime was in fact
committed: an apparent murder victim later being identified as a
suicide. 2 Perhaps it was a case of mistaken identity or blatant miscon-
duct by the arresting officer.' In any event, the arrested person is taken
to the police station and booked, which usually includes taking his
photograph and fingerprints.4 Information concerning his arrest is then
routinely dispatched to various law enforcement agencies, local, state,
and the Federal Bureau of Investigation.5 As of that moment, the
person has acquired a "criminal" record.
In the period between the time of a person's arrest and the final
disposition of the charges against him, courts have recognized a
legitimate public interest in reporting the circumstances of the arrest.'
The fact of the arrest may be reported by the news media, whose rights
to publish such information are guaranteed by the first amendment and
the Freedom of Information Act.7  The arrest record will also be used
as an investigative tool by the police in efforts to obtain further evidence
1. Menard v. Saxbe, 498 F.2d 1017 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
2. United States v. Hudson, 16 CRiM. LAW REP. 2468 (D.C. Super. Ct. 1975)
(Green, C.J.).
3. See, e.g., Loder v. Municipal Ct., 17 Cal. 3d 859, 553 P.2d 264, 132 Cal.
Rptr. 464 (1976); Sterling v. City of Oakland, 208 Cal. App. 2d 1, 24 Cal. Rptr. 696
(1962).
4. See Loder v. Municipal Ct., 17 Cal. 3d 859, 865, 553 P.2d 624, 628, 132
Cal. Rptr. 464, 468 (1976).
5. Id. See generally Karabian, Record of Arrest: The Indelible Stain, 3 PAc.
LI. 20, 26 (1972).
6. See, e.g., Loder v. Municipal Ct., 17 Cal. 3d 859, 865, 553 P.2d 624, 628,
132 Cal. Rptr. 464, 468 (1976).
7. 5 U.S.C. § 552 (Supp. V, 1975), amending 5 U.S.C. § 552 (1970). See
also Tennessean Newspaper, Inc. v. Levi, 403 F. Supp. 1318 (M.D. Tenn. 1975).
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and to solve similar crimes.8 Such uses of arrest records do not violate
individual interests or constitute an invasion of the constitutional right 'to
privacyY
However, after the charges against a person have been dismissed or
he has been acquitted following a trial, law enforcement agencies contin-
ue to use the arrest record, 10 even though the arrested person may have
been completely exculpated. Moreover, the record remains in the com-
puterized files of the FBI, which "circulates information to more than
14,500 private and public agencies as well as the United States Civil
Service Commission, and all branches of the Armed Services. ' - Thus,
even though an arrested person was never convicted of any crime, his
arrest record remains on file.
The existence of an arrest record results in a number of potential
disadvantages for the arrestee. Because his photograph and fingerprints
remain on file and are used in investigating other crimes, a person with
an arrest record has increased chances of becoming a suspect in police
investigations. As one court noted, "it is common knowledge that a
man with an arrest record is much more apt to be subject to police
scrutiny-the first to be questioned and the last eliminated as a suspect
in an investigation."'" Because an arrestee's photograph may be among
the mug shots shown to witnesses regarding other crimes, there is a
continuing danger of his being mistakenly identified and suspected of
criminal activity.
This problem is illustrated by White v. State,'4 in which a person
with a record of one prior arrest was identified two years later from a
photograph as someone who had passed a forged check. Because
White was in another state and the amount of money involved was
small, the prosecutor elected not to prosecute, but the fact that White
had been identified was added to his record. As a result, White lost one
police job and was turned down for others. A judgment of nonsuit was
affirmed in White's subsequent attempt to sue the state for libel and
negligence, with the court noting that the state was protected from tort
8. Loder v. Municipal Ct., 17 Cal. 3d 859, 865, 553 P.2d 624, 628, 132 Cal.
Rptr. 464, 468 (1976).
9. Id. (holding no right of privacy under California Constitution); accord, Paul
v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693 (1976); United States v. Kalish, 271 F. Supp. 968, 970 (D.P.R.
1967) (holding no right of privacy under federal Constitution).
10. Loder v. Municipal Ct., 17 Cal. 3d 859, 865, 553 P.2d 624, 628, 132 Cal.
Rptr. 464, 468 (1976).
11. See Note, Criminal Law-F.B.I. Retention of Criminal Identification Records
-Tarlton v. Saxbe, 29 RUTGERS L. REv. 151 (1975).
12. Karabian, Record of Arrest: The Indelible Stain, 3 PAc. L.J. 20, 26 (1972).
13. Davidson v. Dill, 180 Colo. 123, 127, 503 P.2d 157, 159 (1972).
14. 17 Cal. App. 3d 621, 95 Cal. Rptr. 175 (1971).
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liability by a conditional privilege. 15 In dissenting, Justice Friedman
noted that statutory provisions for final disposition reports1" to be added
15. Significantly, White's initial efforts were aided by the governor and a state
assemblyman, as noted by the court: "In 1967, plaintiff went to the Bureau seeking
to examine his record as he believed it contained erroneous information. He was shown
his file, and he denied that the record was his. He was advised by the Bureau that
if information in the file was incorrect he should have the agency which submitted
the information so advise the Bureau; that the information would not be deleted solely
on his claim that it was false.
"In 1967, at plaintiff's request for assistance, the Governor and others advised plain-
tiff to go to the Bureau to have the matter looked into, and Assemblyman Zenovich's
office inquired into what the record contained in an attempt to assist plaintiff in his
claim that the record was incorrect." Id. at 624, 95 Cal. Rptr. at 117. White was
an upright citizen; he had unquestionably sought to assume an affirmative role in ac-
tively protecting society by. serving as a police officer. Yet because he was identified
from a "mug shot" photograph (taken as a juvenile) as a suspect in a check forgery
case-a case which was never followed up on, thus denying him any opportunity to
respond to a mere suspicion that he was never even aware of-he was denied employ-
ment as a police officer and society lost the potential contributions of this individual.
The author cannot resist adding a further example of the kind of information which
may be stored away in a computer and which may pose a potential threat to individuals
of good character such as White. Recently, a group of police officers were touring
a police records department. After hearing an explanation of how data could be ob-
tained from the computer by the mere entry of a person's name, one officer requested
that his name be entered so he could see the system operate. Although it was suggested
that such a demonstration would be pointless because the officer would have no record,
the request was complied with. To everyone's surprise, particularly the officer who
had made the request, the computer responded that the person had once been suspected
of being a "peeping tom." Understandably upset, the officer immediately commenced
an investigation to discover why this entry was on his record. He eventually learned
the explanation. At one time a woman living in an apartment complex reported a
peeping tom, and as a matter of course the names of all the male residents of the
apartment complex were put on a list of "suspects." The officer, since he resided in
the apartment complex at the time, was included in this list. He was never contacted,
questioned, or even aware of being a suspect. Nevertheless this information became
part of his computer record.
Upon becoming aware of such incidents as this one and the one which led to the
discharge of White, one can only wonder what a computer might have in its memory
banks about each of us, and whether it will ever surface to haunt us.
A final point to be noted in this regard is the holding of the Court of Appeal
in Younger v. Berkeley City Council, 45 Cal. App. 3d 825, 119 Cal. Rptr. 830 (1975).
In response to the arrest record problem, the Berkeley City Council adopted a resolu-
tion establishing a procedure under which Berkeley residents could obtain access to their
state arrest records contained in the files of the Berkeley Police Department and could
challenge the accuracy of entries on these records, including entries based upon arrest
data not supplied by the Berkeley police. The Court of Appeal held that the resolu-
tion went beyond municipal affairs and attempted to address a subject which was pre-
empted by state law authorizing state retention and dissemination of arrest data. Em-
phasizing the state interest in arrest records, the court affirmed an order permanently
enjoining implementation of the resolution. Id. See notes 218-22 & accompanying text
infra.
16. CAL. PEN. CODE §§ 11105, 11115-17 (West Supp. 1977).
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to arrest records offered insufficient protection of individual interests:
Our nation's current social developments harbor insidious evolu-
tionary forces which propel us toward a collective, Orwellian so-
ciety. One of the features of that society is the utter destruction of
privacy, the individual's complete exposure to the all-seeing, all-
powerful police state. Government agencies, civilian and military,
federal, state and local, have acquired miles and acres of files,
enclosing revelations of the personal affairs and conditions of mil-
lions of private individuals. Credit agencies and other business
enterprises assemble similar collections. Information peddlers
burrow into the crannies of these collections. Microfilm and elec-
tronic tape facilitate the storage of private facts on an enormous
scale. Computers permit automated retrieval, assemblage and dis-
semination. These vast repositories of personal information may
easily be assembled into millions of dossiers characteristic of a
police state. Our age is one of shriveled privacy. Leaky statutes
imperfectly guard a small portion of these momumental revela-
tions. Appellate courts should think twice, should locate a balance
between public need and private rights, before deciding that cus-
todians of sensitive personal files may with impunity refuse to
investigate claims of mistaken identity or other error which
threaten the subject with undeserved loss. The office of judges is
to strike that balance rather than pursue sentiments of indignation
or sympathy. It is obvious, nevertheless, that an unwarranted
record of conviction, even of arrest, may ruin an individual's re-
putation, his livelihood, even his life.
17
The White case illustrates the potential problem a person with an arrest
record may face in later being suspected of other criminal activity. We
now turn to the disadvantages of an arrest record in the event that a
person is arrested again and reenters the criminal justice system.
The existence of a prior arrest record is a factor which influences
decisions made at a number of stages in the criminal process. The fact
of a previous arrest, even if not followed by a conviction, may be used
along with other information to support a finding of probable cause for
another arrest.'" A district attorney often takes a prior arrest record
into account in deciding whether to file charges, whether to prosecute as
a felony or misdemeanor, whether to accept a plea bargain, and whether
to recommend a person as eligible for a diversion program. 19 Arrest
data are also used by judges in deciding whether to release a person
without bail. Arrest records additionally play a significant role in post-
trial proceedings. Probation officers consider arrest records in deciding
whether or not to recommend a convicted felon for probation and what
17. White v. State, 17 Cal. App. 3d 621, 631, 95 Cal. Rptr. 175, 181-82 (Fried-
man, J., dissenting in part, concurring in part).
18. Loder v. Municipal Ct., 17 Cal. 3d 859, 866, 533 P.2d 624, 629, 132 Cal.
Rptr. 464, 469 (1976).
19. Id.
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conditions should be imposed, and judges likewise use arrest records in
deciding whether to grant probation.20 Similar use is made of arrest
records by the state adult authority in its determination of when to
release a person on parole.2 In view of these multiple uses of arrest
records within the criminal justice system, such a record poses a substan-
tial and undeserved handicap for an innocent arrestee.
An arrest record may also have repercussions outside the criminal
justice context. With the advent of computer technology and the dis-
semination of arrest data retained in FBI files to numerous public and
private agencies, an arrest record may constitute a serious disadvantage
for individuals seeking employment, credit, admission to schools, or
licenses to enter various trades or professions, 2 although recently enact-
ed legislation may help to alleviate these problems.2 3 Even in the absence
of direct economic loss, an arrest record leaves a blemish on the arres-
tee's reputation. As one federal court observed, "There is an undoubt-
ed 'social stigma' involved in an arrest record. '24
The existence of an arrest record thus includes a lingering threat of
potential hardship for a person who may have been entirely innocent of
any wrongdoing. The dilemma of an innocent arrestee was eloquently
described by a federal court in United States v. Dooley:25
Any citizen, even one with an absolutely clean lifetime record
of not violating the law, through a series of circumstances could
find himself charged with a violation of the law even though he
may be entirely innocent of the charges. Our system of criminaljustice will in due course bring out the truth and he will be cleared.
But his record will not be cleared. And although he has been
cleared under our laws, at any future time the cloud of the pros-
ecution against him will remain to all who one way or another gain
access to it: be it inquiries concerning employment, security clear-
ance, political office or investigations concerning other criminal
offenses.
20. Id. at 867-68, 533 P.2d at 630, 132 Cal. Rptr. at 470. But see People v.
Calloway, 37 Cal. App. 3d 905, 112 Cal. Rptr. 745 (1974).
21. Loder v. Municipal Ct., 17 Cal. 3d 859, 868, 533 P.2d 624, 630, 132 Cal.
Rptr. 464, 470 (1976). See also Tarlton v. Saxbe, 507 F.2d 1116 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
In Loder, the supreme court in dictum cited Azeria v. California Adult Authority, 193
Cal. App. 2d 1, 5, 13 Cal. Rptr. 839, 842 (1961) as authority for the proposition that
arrest records could properly be considered in making parole release decisions. Azeria,
however, appears to derive this rule from In re Harris, 80 Cal. App. 2d 173, 178-79,
181 P.2d 433, 436 (1947), which concerned the propriety of considering conviction
records.
22. See Menard v. Saxbe, 498 F.2d 1017, 1024 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
23. See notes 117-21, 217-22 & accompanying text infra.
24. Menard v. Saxbe, 498 F.2d 1017, 1024 (D.C. Cir. 1974). However, in Loder
v. Municipal Court the supreme court suggested that "the stigma may be measurably
less when the person is an ... adult ... ." 17 Cal. 3d 859, 869 n.7, 533 P.2d 624,
631, 132 Cal. Rptr. 464, 471.
25. 364 F. Supp. 75 (E.D. Pa. 1973).
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And whether or not the information is disclosed, the fear of
the subject person that it will be or may be is always there.2
The question raised by such cases is how to afford sufficient protection
of the rights and interests of the innocent arrestee. The scope of the
present inquiry will include an examination of remedies made available
by judicial and legislative action, focusing upon the approach which has
been adopted in California.
Remedies: Expungement and Record Sealing
The problem posed by the continued existence of arrest records is
not new to the legislatures or the courts. In early cases,27 courts
permitted the return of an exonerated arrestee's portrait which had been
placed in a "rogue's gallery." Currently, however, an arrest record
involves much more than mere display of a photograph and finger-
prints, in that the name of the individual and the charge underlying his
arrest will have been disseminated to qualifying law enforcement agen-
cies and entered in the memory banks of countless computers. In
response to the hardship such a record potentially creates, two basic
types of remedies have emerged: expungement and record sealing.
Definitions
The basis of the distinction between expungement and sealing is
that the former implies physical destruction or obliteration of records,
whereas sealing preserves the records themselves but prohibits dissemni-
nation.28 It must be noted at the outset that while this distinction is
26. Id. at 78-79.
27. See, e.g., State ex rel. Mavity v. Tyndall, 224 Ind. 364, 66 N.E.2d 755 (1946).
28. An interpretation of the sealing remedy as it operates to limit dissemination
is offered in the court's opinion in T.N.G. v. Superior Court, where the court discussed
§ 781 of the Welfare and Institutions Code: "Section 781 provides that the juve-
nile court shall send its sealing order to 'each agency and official named' in the petition
for sealing, 'and each such agency and official shall seal records in its custody as di-
rected by the order, shall advise the court of its compliance, and thereupon shall seal
the copy of the court's order for sealing of records that it or he received.' Hence.
at the conclusion of the sealing process, no agency in this state, other than the juvenile
court which ordered sealing, may retain any information which might provide a link
between a particular juvenile and any contact with the juvenile court. A California
court, however, may not be able to compel the Federal Bureau of Investigation to destroy
detention records it has received from California law enforcement authorities. Nevet-
theless, after a California court has issued a sealing order under section 781, the juvenile
record loses all force and effect, and the juvenile may file an action in federal court
to have the record removed from FBI files." 4 Cal. 3d 767, 777 n.12, 484 P.2d 981,
987, 94 Cal. Rptr. 813, 819 (1971) (emphasis in original and citations omitted). In
regard to current federal regulations providing that the FBI will change its records upon
notification from the contributing agency, see note 118 & accompanying text in! ra.
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recognized in some states,2 9 including California,3" other states do not
differentiate between expungement and sealing.3 1 Moreover, there are
different varieties of relief which do not fit neatly into either category. 3 2
Nonetheless, two general approaches to the arrest record problem are
clearly ascertainable.
The first approach, expungement, involves ordering the destruction
or erasure of all records of arrest, including fingerprints and photo-
graphs, as well as any related court files.33 A closely related remedy
consists of ordering the return of fingerprints and photographs to the
exonerated arrestee.34 The effect of either the physical destruction of
arrest records or their return to the arrestee is to permanently remove
any possibility of future access to these records. In addition to destruc-
tion of local and state arrest records, the remedy of expungement may
provide for notifying all recipient agencies to whom the record was
disseminated."
The alternative remedy of record sealing offers protection of indi-
vidual interests without destruction of official records. This protection
is achieved by severely restricting or totally eliminating access to arrest
records by placing them in locked files or removal to a separate secured
area, and by notifying agencies which received the arrest data of the
sealing order.36
In California, motions for expungement or return of arrest records
have consistently been denied.37  Moreover, in People v. Chapman,38
the court of appeal implied that a legislative provision for "destruction"
of arrest records30 might be unconstitutional as a violation of the separa-
29. See, e.g., Mo. REv. STAT. § 610.100-15 (Supp. 1977), NEV. REv. STAT. §
179.255 (1973). See generally Comment, Criminal Procedure: Expunging the Arrest
Record When There is No Conviction, 28 OKLA. L. REV. 377, 386-87 (1975); Kogon
& Loughery, Sealing and Expungement of Criminal Records-The Big Lie, 61 J. CRIM.
L.C. & P.S. 378 (1970); 2 PEPPERDINE L. REv. 452, 453 (1975).
30. See, e.g., People v. Chapman, 62 Cal. App. 3d 251, 132 Cal. Rptr. 831 (1976);
People v. Municipal Ct. (Blumenshine), 51 Cal. App. 3d 796, 124 Cal. Rptr. 484 (1975),
petition for hearing granted, S.F. 23390 (Sup. Ct., Nov. 25, 1975), cause retrans. Oct.
28, 1976, opinion filed not for pub. (Cal. Ct. App., 1st Dist., Nov. 4, 1976).
31. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 54-90 (Supp. 1977); MD. ANN. CODE
art. 27, §§ 735-41 (Supp. 1976).
32. See generally 46 A.L.R.3d 900 (1972).
33. See, e.g., United States v. Kalish, 271 F. Supp. 968 (D.P.R. 1967).
34. See, e.g., Eddy v. Moore, 5 Wash. App. 334, 487 P.2d 211 (1971).
35. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 54-90 (Supp. 1977).
36. Id. See also MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, §§ 735-41 (Supp. 1976).
37. See Loder v. Municipal Ct., 17 Cal. 3d 859, 533 P.2d 624, 132 Cal. Rptr.
464 (1976); Sterling v. City of Oakland, 208 Cal. App. 2d 1, 24 Cal. Rptr. 696 (1962).
38. 62 Cal. App. 3d 251, 132 Cal. Rptr. 831 (1976), petition for hearing granted,
Crim. No. 19710 (Sup. Ct., Nov. 24, 1976).
39. As quoted in the Chapman case, Health and Safety Code § 11361.5(b)
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tion of powers doctrine, 0 asserting that "[t]he integrity of the court
system requires that the courts have sole custody and control of their
own records."41 The court restricted its holding to a refusal to interpret
Health and Safety Code section 11361.5(b) as requiring the destruction
of records when a sentence or period of probation was not yet served.
However, the court's implied criticism of expungement was reflected in
the comment:
When valuable records of the court are destroyed or portions
thereof obliterated, the integrity of the court system is sacrificed
and the records no longer conform to the truth. This conflicts
with the duty of the judiciary to establish the truth .4 2
Apart from the solitary reference to destruction of records in Health and
Safety Code section 11361.5(b), the California legislature has adopted
the second alternative of record sealing,43 coupled with special statutory
provisions for the dissemination of final disposition reports to agencies
which receive initial arrest information.4"
Having initially delineated the two alternative remedies to the arrest
record problem, it remains to examine the circumstances under which
the courts have granted relief and then to examine legislative treatment
of the problem.
Judicial Conclusions in the Absence of Legislative Relief
When confronted with a petition for return or destruction of arrest
records, the courts have frequently been reluctant to act in the absence
of legislative provisions for such relief, adhering to the judicial doctrine
that the court's role is not to encroach on the law-making functions of
the legislature.45 Nevertheless, in the past decade the question of
expungement of arrest records has been addressed by a number of
courts. A brief summary of some of the decisions arrived at by federal
and state courts provides a useful insight into the factors considered in
the determination of whether relief is to be granted.
provides the possibility of petitioning for a court order which would "order each court
of this state, state agency, and local public agency having records pertaining to the
arrest or conviction to destroy all records thereof in the possession of the court or
agency . . ." People v. Chapman, 62 Cal. App. 3d 251, 254, 132 Cal. Rptr. 831, 832
(1976), petition for hearing granted, Crim. No. 19710 (Sup. Ct., Nov. 24, 1976) (em-
phasis added).
40. See CAL. CONST. art. III, § 3 (West Supp. 1970).
41. 62 Cal. App. 3d at 255, 132 Cal. Rptr. at 833.
42. Id. at 257, 132 Cal. Rptr. at 834.
43. CAL. PEN. CODE §§ 851.7, 851.8, 1203.45 (West Supp. 1976); CAL. WELF.
& INST'NS CODE § 781 (West Supp. 1976).
44. CAL. PEN. CODE §§ 11105, 11115-17 (West Supp. 1976).
45. See, e.g., United States v. Linn, 513 F.2d 925, 927 (10th Cir. 1975); Sterling
v. City of Oakland, 208 Cal. App. 2d 1, 24 Cal. Rptr. 696 (1962).
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The Federal Courts: Paving the Way for Relief
The issue of record expungement has been raised in the federal
courts in a variety of contexts, ranging from mass arrests of antiwar
demonstrators 40 to a motion by an attorney acquitted of charges of mail
fraud and conspiracy. 47 Although there is no specific federal statutory
provision for expungement of arrest records, the power of a federal
court to order expungement has been recognized in a number of cases. 48
However, the courts tend to view this power as one which should be
exercised sparingly, and the decision on whether the remedy of expunge-
ment will be allowed depends on the circumstances of each particular
case. As the court in United States v. Linn2 observed, there is "no
definitive, all-purpose rule to govern requests of this nature, and to a
considerable degree each case must stand on its own two feet."50
To arrive at an understanding of what kind of circumstances are
viewed as warranting an order of expungement of arrest records, one
must turn to the facts of the cases where the issue of expungement has
been raised. The cases brought to the federal courts may be viewed as
consisting of two general types. The first category encompasses cases
involving mass arrests for the purpose of harassment or multiple arrests
made without probable cause. An early example of this type of case
was United States v. McLeod,51 in which the court found that a series
of arrests and prosecutions of blacks had been aimed at intimidating
them so that they would not register to vote. In addition to directing
the return of all fines and reimbursement of court costs incurred, the
court ordered the expungement of all arrest and prosecution records. A
similar case involving expungement was Hughes v. Rizzo, 52 in which a
series of arrests made to rid a park of hippies was found to have been
invalid. Because the arrests had been illegal, the court directed ex-
pungement of all arrest records and ordered that all related photographs
be returned or destroyed. Large scale arrests of antiwar demonstrators
were similarly found to be illegal in Sullivan v. Murphy,"3 in which the
court ordered that maintenance and dissemination of records of the
arrests should be limited, noting that "the very presence of these records
carries the strong implication that the underlying arrest and detention
were somehow justified." 54
46. Sullivan v. Murphy, 478 F.2d 938 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
47. United States v. Linn, 513 F.2d 925 (10th Cir. 1975).
48. See, e.g., Kowall v. United States, 53 F.R.D. 211 (W.D. Mich. 1971); Sullivan
v. Murphy, 478 F.2d 938 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
49. 513 F.2d 925 (10th Cir. 1975).
50. Id. at 927.
51. 385 F.2d 734 (5th Cir. 1967).
52. 282 F. Supp. 881 (E.D. Pa. 1968).
53. 478 F.2d 938 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
54. Id. at 969.
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A final example of the multiple arrest type of cases is Wilson v.
Webster.55 In Wilson, the plaintiffs in a class action alleged that they
had been arrested without justification in Isla Vista during a period of
unrest at the Santa Barbara campus of the University of California. The
district court refused to issue an injunction against the sheriff and other
county officials and dismissed a request for an order directing the
cancellation of arrest records of plaintiffs where there had been an
acquittal or the charges had been dismissed. On appeal, the Ninth
Circuit affirmed the denial of injunctive relief against county officials on
the grounds of mootness 0 but held that the district court should not
have summarily dismissed the record cancellation issue. Instead, the
court suggested that the plaintiffs were entitled to a "full hearing" on the
issue of expungement, noting that "fundamental rights" of the arrested
persons might be impaired by the continued existence of the arrest
records.5 7
While the courts have found expungement to be readily justified by
the circumstances in mass arrest cases where the initial arrests could be
characterized as harassment of unpopular groups, the process of justifi-
cation becomes more elaborate in cases involving a single arrestee. In
this second type of case, the courts have approached the expungement
question as one of balancing individual rights and interests against the
government's need for a record-keeping function in the course of its law
enforcement activities. While some courts have granted expungement
as a means of protecting the individual's right of privacy, other courts
have suggested that expungement is warranted only when there are
other extraordinary circumstances, such as the illegality of the initial
arrest.
The question of whether an individual's right of privacy was violat-
ed by the existence of arrest records was initially raised in United States
v. Kalish.5 8  The plaintiff had been arrested when he appeared for a
habeas corpus hearing in which he sought to test the constitutionality of
the draft. Subsequently he moved for an order to expunge the record of
his arrest and to destroy all related photographs and fingerprints, noting
that he had acted on advice of counsel in his initial refusal to submit to
induction and that he had willingly gone into the army after the dismis-
sal of his habeas corpus petition. The court distinguished the nature of
the individual's interest in privacy before and after exoneration, con-
cluding that an individual's interest in privacy was not constitutionally
55. 467 F.2d 1282 (9th Cir. 1972).
56. Id. at 1283 (school year had ended, curfew had been rescinded, thus repetition
in the future of official misconduct considered unlikely).
57. Id. at 1283-84. As to the continued viability of this view, see Paul v. Davis,
424 U.S. 693 (1976). See text & accompanying notes 83-90 infra.
58. 271 F. Supp. 968 (D.P.R. 1967).
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protected at the time of arrest. However, after he had been exonerated,
the individual again had a right to privacy which was not outweighed by
legitimate government interests:
There can be no denying of the efficacy of fingerprint infor-
mation, photographs, and other means of identification in the
apprehension of criminals and fugitives. Law enforcement agen-
cies must utilize all scientific data in society's never-ending battle
against lawlessness and crime. When arrested, an accused does
not have a constitutional right of privacy that outweighs the neces-
sity of protecting society and the accumulation of this data, no
matter how mistaken the arrest may have been.
However, when an accused is acquitted of the crime or when
he is discharged without conviction, no public good is accom-
plished by the retention of criminal identification records. On the
other hand, a great imposition is placed upon the citizen. His
privacy and personal dignity is invaded as long as the Justice
Department retains "criminal" identification records, "criminal"
arrest, fingerprints and a rogue's gallery photograph. . . . The
preservation of these records constitutes an unwarranted attack
upon his character and reputation and . . . violates his dignity as
a human being."9
To protect the plaintiffs right of privacy, the court ordered the records
destroyed.
Protection of individual interests was also a justification for ex-
pungement in Kowall v. United States,60 in which a conviction for
failure to report for induction was set aside by the trial court, which also
ordered that the arrest records be expunged. The government argued
that the right of privacy was outweighed by the public's interest in
maintaining criminal identification files. In response to this argument,
the court noted the numerous adverse effects which an arrest record
could have on an individual's reputation, economic opportunities, and
future contacts with the criminal justice system:
Even if no direct economic loss is involved, the injury to an indi-
vidual's reputation may be substantial. Economic losses them-
selves may be both direct and serious. Opportunities for school-
ing, employment, or professional licenses may be restricted or
nonexistent as a consequence of the mere fact of an arrest, even
if followed by acquittal or complete exoneration of the charges
involved. An arrest record may be used by the police in deter-
mining whether subsequently to arrest the individual concerned,
or whether to exercise their discretion to bring formal charges
against an individual already arrested. 61
The court also referred to uses of arrest records for impeachment of
witnesses and the impact of such records on decisions of whether to
59. Id. at 970.
60. 53 F.R.D. 211 (W.D. Mich. 1971).
61. Id. at 214-15.
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release an arrestee on his own recognizance.6 2 In view of these poten-
tial disadvantages to the individual posed by the retention of the arrest
record, the court affirmed the expungement order.63
The repercussions of an arrest record resulting from its retention
and dissemination by the FBI were subjected to judicial scrutiny in the
cases of Menard v. Saxbe 4 and Tarlton v. Saxbe.5 In Menard, a
nineteen year old man was waiting for a friend in a park late at night
when he was approached by police and questioned. Despite the subse-
quent arrival of the friend, the young man was arrested and detained for
two days. No complaint was ever filed, but the police department
routinely forwarded the arrestee's fingerprints to the FBI along with the
notation that he was arrested for burglary and released. An action was
brought to compel the FBI to remove the fingerprints and notation of
the arrest from FBI files. The district court denied relief. 6 On appeal,
the court of appeals reversed, rejecting the argument that the plaintiff
had suffered mere personal distress rather than legal injury, and observ-
ing that "[a]lthough Menard cannot point with mathematical certainty
to the exact consequences of his criminal file, we think it clear that he
has alleged a 'cognizable legal injury.' "67 Noting the FBI's position
that the decision to expunge must be made at the local level, the court
did not order expungement but suggested that such an action should be
maintained against the local law enforcement agencies. However, the
court did order the transfer of Menard's records from the FBI's crimi-
nal index to the neutral index upon notification that the arrestee had
merely been detained and released. 8
In Tarlton v. Saxbe,69 the question of incomplete FBI records was
raised in an action seeking to expunge entries of arrests without final
disposition reports. The plaintiff, who was serving a prison sentence,
alleged that the arrest record information supplied by the FBI influ-
enced the court in sentencing him and affected the United States Parole
Board's decision to deny parole. Interpreting 28 U.S.C. section 534,70
62. Id. at 215.
63. Id. at 214.
64. 498 F.2d 1017 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
65. 507 F.2d 1116 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
66. 498 F.2d at 1019.
67. Id. at 1023.
68. Id. at 1028 (neutral index includes fingerprints of all citizens for identifica-
tion).
69. 507 F.2d 1116 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
70. 28 U.S.C. § 534 (1970) provides: "(a) The Attorney General shall (1) ac-
quire, collect, classify, and preserve identification, criminal identification, crime, and
other records; and (2) exchange these records with, and for the official use of, au-
thorized officials of the Federal Government, the States, cities, and penal and other
institutions.
"(b) The exchange of records authorized by subsection (a)(2) of this section is
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which authorizes the Attorney General to keep criminal identification
records, the court found that the FBI had a duty to take reasonable
measures to ensure that its files were accurate. Asserting that to permit
the FBI to disseminate inaccurate information would be tantamount to
allowing individuals to be accused of criminal conduct without provid-
ing them the opportunity to disprove the charges, the court implied a
possible due process consideration. 71 The court also discussed possible
infringements of the individual's constitutional right of privacy and
referred to the common law principle forbidding defamation of innocent
individuals.72  The court then reversed and remanded, holding that a
cause of action existed relating to a duty of inquiry placed on the FBI.73
The Kalish, Kowall, Menard, and Tarlton cases are similar in that
concern for protecting individual privacy was the basis of judicial action
aimed at counteracting the adverse effects of arrest records. However,
other courts have concluded that individual interests did not warrant
judicial intervention in this area.
In United States v. Dooley,74 the court held that expungement
could not be granted in the absence of extraordinary circumstances.7 5
The court based its decision on the view that the legislature was the
proper body to make the remedy of expungement available, but it voiced
concern for individuals mistakenly arrested who would be unable to
clear their records. The court saw no legitimate government interest in
retaining records of arrests not resulting in conviction:
Unresolved arrest records generally may well have significance for
law enforcement purposes . . . . But charges resulting in acquit-
tal clearly have no legitimate significance. Likewise, other charges
which the government fails or refuses to press or which it with-
draws are entitled to no greater legitimacy.76
Nevertheless, the court reluctantly declined to grant expungement in
view of the lack of legislation providing this remedy.
subject to cancellation if dissemination is made outside the receiving departments or
related agencies.
"(c) The Attorney General may appoint officials to perform the functions au-
thorized by this section."
71. "Dissemination of inaccurate criminal information without the precaution of
reasonable efforts to forestall inaccuracy restricts the subject's liberty without any pro-
cedural safeguards designed to prevent such inaccuracies." 507 F.2d at 1123.
72. Id. at 1124.
73. Id. at 1131.
74. 364 F. Supp. 75 (E.O. Pa. 1973).
75. Id. at 78-79. In referring to the absence of extraordinary circumstances, the
court noted cases allowing expungement where the arrests were made without probable
cause or for purposes of harassment, as distinguished from the "typical" or "normal"
cases. Id. at 78.
76. Id. at 77.
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A narrower position was adopted in United States v. Rosen,7 in
which the court refused to order the return of photographs, fingerprints,
and arrest records of two defendants who had been charged with
unlawful importation and receipt of wigs. One of the defendants was
acquitted, and other charges against the two defendants were dismissed.
The court held that in balancing the equities between the individual
right of privacy and the right of law enforcement officials to perform
their duties, the law enforcement interest was paramount in view of the
failure to allege economic injury, harassment, or improper use of the
records. With regard to the dismissed charges, the court pointed out
that "[a] dismissal does not necessarily go to a consideration of the
merits." ' Moreover, even in cases of acquittal the court felt that arrest
records should be retained in the absence of a statute or an illegal
arrest.7 9  This view was reiterated in United States v. Linn,80 in which
an attorney, acquitted of 65 counts of such charges as mail fraud and
conspiracy, sought expungement, noting the danger to his professional
reputation and asserting an invasion of his right to privacy. Asserting
that "an acquittal, standing alone, is not in itself sufficient to warrant an
expunction of an arrest record ..... ,,1 the court suggested that relief
"should be reserved for the unusual or extreme case." -8 2
Viewing the cases of individual arrestees together, it would appear
that early cases paved the way for the granting of relief based primarily
on a consideration of the individual's right to privacy. However, a
narrower view was taken in some cases which suggested that expunge-
ment should be granted only in extraordinary circumstances. Under
these later decisions, it would appear that protecting the right of privacy
would alone be insufficient grounds for judicial action; the threat to
privacy must be coupled with some other actual or threatened injury.
The question of what weight to give the individual right to privacy
in the balancing process is further complicated by the Supreme Court's
recent holding in Paul v. Davis."3 This case involved a claim for relief
under section 1983 of the 1866 Civil Rights Act,8 4 based on the inclu-
sion of Mr. Davis' name and photographs on a flyer of "active shoplift-
ers" which was circulated to some 800 merchants in the vicinity of
Louisville, Kentucky. Mr. Davis had been arrested by a store security
77. 343 F. Supp. 804 (S.D.N.Y. 1972).
78. Id. at 806.
79. Id. at 808.
80. 513 F.2d 925 (10th Cir. 1975).
81. Id. at 927-28.
82. Id. at 927.
83. 424 U.S. 693 (1976).
84. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1970) (providing cause of action against state officials
for violating an individual's civil rights).
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guard for shoplifting in June, 1971. He was arraigned in September of
that year and pleaded not guilty, at which time the charge was "filed
away with leave [to reinstate]."' 85 The flyer including Mr. Davis' name
and picture was issued in November 1972. Shortly after circulation of
the flyer, a judge finally dismissed the shoplifting charge. In upholding
the district court's dismissal of Davis' civil rights claim on the ground
that it failed to allege deprivation of any constitutional right, the Su-
preme Court held that damage to Davis' "reputation" resulting from
dissemination of the flyer did not deprive him of liberty or property
within the meaning of the fourteenth amendment and did not intrude on
the constitutionally protected zones of privacy recognized by previous
decisions.80 Although there is room for disagreement,817 the ruling has
been taken to mean that there is no right of privacy in arrest records
under the United States Constitution.8"
In assessing the impact of Paul v. Davis on expungement cases, it is
clear that the Supreme Court's holding that the interest in "reputation"
alone will not be given constitutional protection could be relied on as
grounds for denying motions for expungement. However, Paul v. Davis
does not require a departure from cases permitting expungement. A
significant difference between Paul v. Davis and the expungement cases
is the nature of the relief sought. The plaintiff in Paul v. Davis sought
damages as well as injunctive relief, a remedy which could have been
obtained by a common law claim for defamation, as the Court suggest-
ed."9 An underlying motive of the decision appears to be to avoid
expanding liability of government officers under section 1983. How-
ever, a more critical distinction which may be identified is the nature of
the individual interest in privacy asserted by Davis. At the time the
circular was issued, the charges against Davis had not been finally
dismissed, but remained outstanding. In United States v. Kalish, 0 the
court distinguished between the rights of an individual before and after
exoneration and concluded that the constitutionally protected right of
privacy which justified expungement did not arise until after the arrestee
had been acquitted or discharged. Thus, even under the expungement
cases, no recognition was given to the individual right of privacy prior to
final dismissal of charges underlying an arrest, and dissemination of
arrest information in this pre-exoneration period would not be preclud-
ed.
85. 424 U.S. at 696.
86. Id. at 712-13.
87. See text accompanying notes 159-65 infra.
88. Loder v. Municipal Ct., 17 Cal. 3d 859, 877 n.24, 553 P.2d 624, 637, 132
Cal. Rptr. 464, 477 (1976).
89. 424 U.S. at 697.
90. 271 F. Supp. 968 (D.P.R. 1967).
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Expungement addresses the question of whether the government
has a legitimate interest in disseminating arrest information after the
arrestee has been exonerated. The issue of the individual right to
privacy after acquittal or discharge is not directly determined by Paul v.
Davis. Nevertheless, this decision may effectively block the road to
relief in future federal cases on expungement if the Supreme Court's
language is broadly construed.
Other States: Eddy v. Moore, Davidson v. Dill, and
United States v. Hudson
This section does not purport to address the development of ex-
pungement case law in all state courts; instead, only three cases will be
examined, all of which addressed the arrest record problem in terms of
the individual right to privacy.
In Eddy v. Moore, 1 the Washington Court of Appeals considered
a petition for the return of fingerprints and photographs after charges of
assault had been dismissed. The court pinpointed the problem of
increased police scrutiny as a primary disadvantage flowing from an
arrest record:
An individual who has been arrested and then acquitted has an
undeniably greater visibility to the police than other persons. His
fingerprints, and more particularly his photograph, are available
to be shown to other citizens as a potential suspect to be chosen
in prearrest lineups, an identification procedure frequently used
by law enforcement agencies. Increased police scrutiny resulting
from an arrest record and its potential invasion of the individual's
private life, if it occurs, should rest upon rational factors. 92
The court then determined that when an arrested person had been
acquitted of criminal charges, there remained no rational basis for the
retention of fingerprints and photographs. Turning to an evaluation of
the exonerated person's right to privacy, the court made reference to the
fundamental principle that an accused is presumed innocent until prov-
en guilty beyond a reasonable doub 93 and concluded:
We believe the right of an individual, absent a compelling showing
of necessity by the government, to the return of his fingerprints
and photographs, upon an acquittal, is a fundamental right implicit
in the concept of ordered liberty and that it is as well within the
penumbras of the specific guarantees of the Bill of Rights . . .94
Pursuant to this conclusion, the fingerprints and photographs were
ordered returned.
91. 5 Wash. App. 334, 487 P.2d 211 (1971).
92. Id. at 344, 487 P.2d at 216.
93. See In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970).
94. 5 Wash. App. at 345, 487 P.2d at 214, citing Griswold v. Connecticut, 381
U.S. 479, 484 (1965).
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In Davidson v. Dill,95 the Supreme Court of Colorado considered a
motion for return or expungement of arrest records following a jury's
acquittal of the plaintiff who had been charged with loitering. Noting
the increased threat of personal or economic harm posed by dissemina-
tion of computerized arrest records, the court considered whether the
individual's right to privacy outweighed the public interest in retaining
arrest rccords of acquitted defendants:
The complaint presents an extremely important issue . . involv-
ing a constitutional right of the highest magnitude-an individual's
right to privacy vis-a-vis the propriety of the police retaining that
person's arrest records in police files after he had been acquitted
of criminal conduct.96
After weighing the issue, the court reversed the dismissal of the plain-
tiff's action for failure to state a claim upon which relief could be
granted.
One of the most interesting cases dealing with the arrest record
problem was United States v. Hudson,9 7 decided by a superior court in
the District of Columbia. The plaintiff sought expungement of records
of his arrest for murder after proof that the victim was a suicide led to a
dismissal of the charges against him. The court rejected the suggested
alternative of entering a notation indicating no conviction as being
"unrealistic," commenting, "[t]he existence of an arrest record, whether
amplified or not, and whether or not followed by a conviction, will
subject the arrestee to a host of disabilities . ."98 The court further
concluded:
Besides leading to the practical disabilities discussed earlier, failure
to expunge an innocent person's arrest record violates constitu-
tional protections, including the rights to privacy and due process.
The courts have a special obligation, within their area of jurisdic-
tion, to call a halt to the indiscriminate accumulation of informa-
tion that threatens privacy and liberty.99
The court raised several new questions, including whether permitting
retention of arrest records could deprive the arrestee of due process in
violation of the fifth amendment and constitute a denial of equal protec-
tion. 00 The court further noted that there could be cases in which
retention of arrest records would be warranted, as in dismissals of
criminal charges due to suppression of vital evidence or the death of an
essential witness. However, under the circumstances presented in the
case at bar, the court felt that concern for the individual's right of
95. 180 Colo. 123, 503 P.2d 157 (1972).
96. Id. at 132, 503 P.2d at 162.
97. 16 CRIM. LAw REP. 2468 (D.C. Super. Ct. 1975) (Green, C.J.).
98. Id. at 2468.
99. Id. at 2469.
100. Id.
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privacy and due process dictated an order that the arrest record be
expunged.
In the three cases just discussed, the courts responded to the arrest
record problem by providing judicial relief to protect the right of privacy
of individuals who had been exonerated of criminal charges. We now
turn to California's response.
California: The Failure of Judicial Relief
The first California case to address the arrest records problem was
Sterling v. City of Oakland,1"' decided in 1962 by the court of appeal.
Mrs. Sterling had taken a taxi home, and, upon reaching her destination,
attempted to pay the $1.90 fare with a twenty dollar bill. The taxi
driver would not accept the bill, commenting that she should know
better, and stating that he would take Mrs. Sterling to a place where she
could get change and would charge her the extra fare. Mrs. Sterling
refused to pay the extra amount. The taxi driver in turn refused to let
Mrs. Sterling leave the cab, called the police, and made a citizen's arrest.
Mrs. Sterling was booked for a misdemeanor, 102 but the case was
dismissed when the taxi driver did not appear to testify. Mrs. Sterling
filed a civil action against the cab company for false imprisonment and
malicious prosecution and obtained verdicts in her favor. She then
brought an action against the City of Oakland seeking the return of her
fingerprints and photograph and the destruction of her arrest record.1 1 3
As an adult against whom criminal charges have been dismissed,
Mrs. Sterling was (and still would be) outside the class of persons to
whom the remedy of record sealing has been made available by legisla-
tion. The court refused to order the return of her fingerprints and
photograph, noting that no California statute prescribed such action and
distinguishing early cases from other jurisdictions which concerned the
return of pictures publicly exhibited in a "rogue's gallery."'0 4  Like-
wise, the court refused to order the return or expungement of Mrs.
Sterling's arrest record, commenting upon the absence of legislation
providing this remedy and suggesting that the statutory requirement for
a disposition report' to be included in criminal records afforded
sufficient protection of Mrs. Sterling's interests.
The position taken by the court in Sterling was recently reiterated
101. 208 Cal. App. 2d 1, 24 Cal. Rptr. 696 (1962). See also Alexander and Walz,
Arrest Record Expungernent in California: The Polishing of Sterling, 9 U.S.F.L. REv.
299 (1974).
102. OAKLAND, CAL., MUNICIPAL CODE § 5-14.181 (amended 1969).
103. 208 Cal. App. 2d at 3, 24 Cal. Rptr. at 697.
104. Id. at 6, 24 Cal. Rptr. at 699.
105. CAL. PEN. CODE §§ 11115-17 (West Supp. 1977).
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by the California Supreme Court in Loder v. Municipal Court.106 Lod-
er had been arrested for obstructing a police officer, battery, and
disturbing the peace after he attacked a police officer who was beating
Loder's wife with a nightstick. The officer was reported for the incident
and temporarily suspended from duty. The complaint against Loder was
subsequently dismissed in consideration for Loder's execution of a
covenant not to sue. Loder then sought an order to compel the return
or erasure of his arrest record and notification to all agencies which had
received arrest data to do likewise, alleging that the receipt of this
information by the San Diego school district resulted in his not being
rehired.
The California Supreme Court opened its discussion of the Loder
case by noting that there was no statute requiring erasure or return of
arrest records and that, furthermore, there was a statute specifically
prohibiting the destruction, alteration, or removal of government
records. 07 The court then discussed the multiple uses of arrest records
in a number of stages of the criminal justice system, finding these uses to
constitute a substantial government interest. 0 8  Citing legislation' 9
directed at diminishing the risks of inaccuracy, improper dissemination,
and economic disadvantages, the court concluded that the individual
right of privacy was outweighed by concern for the promotion of more
efficient law enforcement through limited retention and dissemination of
arrest records. 10 Noting that the legislature had recently failed to
adopt a proposal to allow sealing of arrest records where charges were
dismissed,"' the court reiterated the Sterling position that judicial inter-
vention was unwarranted" 2 and affirmed the denial of Loder's request.
In view of Loder v. Municipal Court, a judicially created remedy
of expungement or return of arrest records is not likely to be reached in
California in the near future. Existing legislation does not provide the
remedy of sealing to innocent persons against whom charges were
brought and subsequently dismissed, although a recent statute offers this
possibility for acquitted arrestees." 3 Thus in California, there remains
no recourse for the likes of Mrs. Sterling.
106. 17 Cal. 3d 859, 553 P.2d 624, 132 Cal. Rptr. 464 (1976).
107. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 6200 (West Supp. 1977).
108. 17 Cal. 3d at 864-68, 553 P.2d at 628-30, 132 Cal. Rptr. at 468-70.
109. See, e.g., CAL. PEN. CODE §§ 11115-17 (disposition reports), §§ 11120-26 (ex-
amination by subjects of criminal records), §§ 11141-43 (unauthorized furnishing or
receipt of records a misdemeanor) (West Supp. 1977); CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE §§
461, 475 (prohibiting denial of professional licenses) (West Supp. 1977); CAL. LABOR
CODE § 432.7 (prohibiting use by employers of records of detention or arrest not result-
ing in conviction) (West Supp. 1976).
110. 17 Cal. 3d at 868-69, 553 P.2d at 630-31, 132 Cal. Rptr. at 470-71.
111. See note 150 & accompanying text, infra.
112. 17 Cal. 3d at 876, 553 P.2d at 636, 132 Cal. Rptr. at 476.
113. CAL. PEN. CODE § 851.8 (West Supp. 1976).
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Statutory Schemes: Legislative Treatment of the Problem
The arrest record problem has not gone unnoticed in Congress and
state legislative bodies. A thorough survey of existing legislation will
not be attempted here, inasmuch as other commentators have catalogued
the types of relief provided by state and federal statutes.114 However,
an examination of a few examples of legislative responses to the arrest
record problem outside California will be provided by way of introduc-
tion to the response of the California state legislature.
Federal Regulations and the Privacy Act
Although there is a limited provision for record cancellation pro-
vided by federal statute,"15 it has been criticized as ineffective and is
seldom invoked." 6 Instead, the major reforms of the practice of wide-
spread dissemination of arrest records by the FBI have been wrought by
administrative action. Under recently added sections of the Code of
Federal Regulations, the subject of an FBI record can request a copy of
his record. 7 If he believes the record to be incorrect and wishes to
change it, he must apply to the contributor (usually the local law
enforcement agency) of the questioned information; the FBI will
change the record only upon receipt of an official communication from
the contributing agency.118 A more significant change is the FBI's new
policy not to include arrest data over a year old in the records it
disseminates for purposes of employment and licensing unless there has
been a report of final disposition. 1 9 However, this limitation does not
apply to the dissemination of arrest information to law enforcement
offices and agencies of the federal government.'l 0
A further measure directed at reducing the potential for individual
harm resulting from dissemination of arrest records is the Privacy Act of
1974.121 This statute aims to limit dissemination unrelated to law
enforcement purposes and establishes civil and criminal remedies for
intentional disclosures in violation of the statute. A federal court
recently interpreted this statute in Tennessean Newspaper, Inc. v.
114. See Comment, Criminal Procedure: Expunging the Arrest Record When
There is No Conviction, 28 OKLA. L. REV. 377, 386-87 (1975) (survey of state legisla-
tion); Note, Criminal Law-F.B.I. Retention of Criminal Identification Records-Tarl-
ton v. Saxbe, 29 RUTGERS L. REV. 151, 155-56, 164-65 (1975) (discussion of federal
legislation and regulations).
115. 28 U.S.C. § 534(b) (1970). See note 70 supra.
116. Note, Criminal Law-F.B.I. Retention of Criminal Identification Records-
Tarlton v. Saxbe, 29 RUTGERS L. REV. 151, 155-56 (1975).
117. 28 C.F.R. § 16.32 (1974).
118. Id. § 16.34.
119. 28 C.F.R. § 50.12(b) (1976).
120. Id. § 50.12(c).
121. 5 U.S.C. § 552a (Supp. V, 1975).
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Levi'2 2 as requiring the application of a balancing test to determine
whether an invasion of privacy is unwarranted.
The net effect of these recent additions to federal regulations and
statutes is to provide the remedy of limiting dissemination of FBI
records and to curtail disclosure of incomplete arrest data outside the
law enforcement context. However, any change in the records them-
selves must be made at the local level. Thus, state expungement or
sealing statutes assume an important role.
State Legislative Remedies: Some Examples
The problems raised by arrest records have elicited responses from
a number of state legislatures in the form of laws aimed at alleviating the
burden on arrested persons discharged without conviction. The solu-
tions provided include provisions for the destruction, return, or sealing
of arrest records, or limitations on dissemination. Aside from these
differences in the nature of relief granted, there are further distinctions
to be drawn in the various states' approaches to record expungement or
sealing. Whereas the relief is automatically provided in some states,1
23
in other states the exonerated arrestee must petition for relief. 24 Some
states provide for a hearing and judicial determination on whether to
grant relief. 125  Relief may be restricted to persons with no prior
record. -126  No attempt will be made to survey the variety of remedies
available in the various states.' 2 7 Instead, attention will be focused on a
few selected examples of legislative responses.
A first example of a statute providing for automatic relief is
Connecticut's recently enacted legislation which provides for immediate
erasure of all police and prosecution records relating to an arrestee
who was subsequently acquitted or discharged without conviction. 28
Under the statute, notice of erasure is forwarded to all agencies
to which the arrest information is known to have been disseminated, and
122. 403 F. Supp. 1318 (M.D. Tenn. 1975). However, the court found that the
facts of the case (routine dissemination of arrest information to the news media) were
insufficient to compel nondisclosure. Such routine disclosure did not violate the Pri-
vacy Act and was required by the Freedom of Information Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552 (1970
& Supp. V 1975).
123. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 54-90 (West Supp. 1976); Mo. REv.
STAT. §§ 610.100-15 (Supp. 1973).
124. See, e.g., NEv. REv. STAT. § 179.255 (1973); MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, §§
735-41 (Supp. 1976).
125. Id.
126. See, e.g., W. VA. CODE ANN. § 15-2-29(h) (1972).
127. For a discussion of remedies provided in various jurisdictions, see Comment,
Criminal Procedure: Expunging the Arrest Record When There is No Conviction, 28
OKLA. L. REV. 377, 386-87 (1975).
128. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 54-90 (Supp. 1976).
July 1977]
THE HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL
the records themselves are either put in locked files or, at the exonerated
individual's request, physically destroyed. Moreover, the relief is
made retroactive, so that pre-1969 arrest records will be erased at the
request of the arrested person. However, erasure is not allowed for a
count for which a nolle prosequi was entered, where the arrestee was
convicted on other counts arising from the same transaction, and there is
a thirteen month waiting period preceding the erasure of records of
other charges terminated by entry of a nolle prosequi. A comparable
automatic sealing statute has been adopted in Missouri, under which
records are sealed whenever an arrested person is found not guilty or the
charges against him are followed by entry of a nolle prosequi or dismis-
sal. 129 Missouri has further provided for automatic sealing within thirty
days of records relating to a detention, and such records must be
expunged after a year.' 30
In contrast to automatic relief, other states have provided for
expungement upon the petition of the exonerated arrestee. In Mary-
land,13' a person who was detained and released can request expunge-
ment by written notice to the law enforcement agency involved, which
must investigate the request. In the event of a denial, the arrestee can
petition for a judicial hearing on the matter. Where there was an
acquittal, dismissal, or nolle prosequi, a hearing is held on the issue of
expungement upon the filing of a petition by the arrestee. The court's
decision can be appealed by both the state and the arrested person.
Expungement is not allowed if the arrestee is subsequently convicted of
another crime or is a defendant in a pending criminal proceeding, and
there is a three year waiting period unless the arrestee waives any tort
claims arising as a result of the arrest. A comparable provision allow-
ing record sealing at the petition of an arrestee filed thirty days after
dismissal or acquittal exists under Nevada law.'3 2 Under this statute,
there is a hearing on the issue at which the prosecutor may testify and
present evidence. Following the hearing, the court may order the
records sealed.
A final example representing another legislative answer to the
arrest record problem is Arizona's provision for entering a notation that
the arrestee was cleared and prohibiting the dissemination of the record
where a person was "wrongfully arrested."' 33  An arrestee may petition
the court for relief after obtaining a written statement from the prosecu-
129. Mo. REV. STAT. § 610.105 (Supp. 1973).
130. Id. § 610.100.
131. MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 736 (Supp. 1976).
132. NEV. REV. STAT. § 179.255 (1973).
133. ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-1761 (Supp. 1976). See also Beasley v. Glenn,
110 Ariz. 438, 520 P.2d 310 (1974) (statute held not to provide for expungement of
records but only notation for limited dissemination).
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tor that the person will not be prosecuted. After a hearing on the
petition, if the court believes that justice will be served by entry of a
notation that the person was cleared, it can order such entry with an
accompanying justification, after which no copies of the record may be
released without a court order. While this statute does not provide for
expungement, it offers protection for the limited class of persons arrest-
ed in error, but disallows this remedy for defendants who obtain dismis-
sals on other grounds.
After this brief glance at a few of the solutions adopted by other
states, we now turn to California's legislative response to the arrest
record problem.
California's New Record Sealing Statute: Penal Code Section 851.8
In California, the legislature has made statutory provisions for the
sealing of criminal records of a limited class of individuals. Until
recently, the opportunity of having all official records sealed was availa-
ble only to juveniles arrested for misdemeanors. 134  Although the right
to have one's record sealed has not been extended to persons released
without being charged, Penal Code section 851.6 provides that records
referring to such incidents as arrests will be deleted and they will be
referred to only as detentions. Finally, in 1975, the legislature enacted
section 851.8 of the Penal Code which provides the possibility of record
sealing after acquittal where it appears to the judge that the defendant
was "factually innocent."
In order to determine the value of this recent response to the arrest
record problem, one must begin with an examination of the statute.
Penal Code section 851.8 provides:
Whenever a person is acquitted of a charge and it appears to the
judge presiding at the trial wherein such acquittal occurred that
the defendant was factually innocent of the charge, the judge may
order that the records in the case be sealed, including any record
of arrest or detention, upon the written or oral motion of any
party in the case or the court, and with notice to all parties to
the case. If such an order is made, the court shall give to the
defendant a copy of such order and inform the defendant that he
may thereafter state that he was not arrested for such charge and
that he was found innocent of such charge by the court.135
The relief offered by the new statute is not automatic but must be
requested by motion or suggested by the court. While judicial review is
indicated by the requirement that the arrestee must appear factually
innocent to the trial judge, there is no specific provision for a hearing as
134. CAL. PEN. CODE §§ 851.7, 1203.45, 11105.5 (West Supp. 1976); CAL. WELF.
& INST'NS CODE § 781 (West Supp. 1976). See notes 139-44 & accompanying text
infra.
135. CAL. PEN. CODE § 851.8 (West Supp. 1976).
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required in other states. However, if an arrestee's records are ordered
sealed under this statute, all officers and agencies to which the arrest
information was disseminated will be notified of the sealing order. 136
In considering how this new legislation serves to remedy the plight
of the innocent arrestee, certain problems become apparent. Although
the statute purports to offer relief to an acquitted arrestee, this relief is
conditioned upon the trial judge's determination that the accused was
"factually innocent." This limitation on the availability of sealing is
comparable to the Arizona statute providing relief only to persons
"wrongfully arrested."' 3  However, unlike the solution adopted in
Arizona and other states, there is no mention of a hearing in the Cali-
fornia statute, nor is there any express provision for appeal. More-
over, the California statute omits from the class of persons eligible for
relief a number of potentially innocent persons wrongfully arrested but
discharged by dismissal of charges. It is significant to note that the
language of Penal Code section 851.8 is permissive, as contrasted with
other sealing statutes. In Penal Code section 851.8, the judge is not
required to order sealing if he believes the defendant to have been
factually innocent; the statute only provides that "the judge may order
that the records in the case be sealed." In contrast, the sealing remedy
provided for under Penal Code section 851.7 for juveniles is codified
in language suggesting that the remedy is mandatory: "If the court finds
that the petitioner is eligible for relief under subdivision (a), it shall
issue its order granting the relief prayed for." Likewise, Health and
Welfare Code section 781 provides a mandatory sealing remedy if the
eligibility requirements are satisfied.
The California remedy of sealing is thus available only to the few
factually innocent persons who are forced to stand trial and are acquit-
ted, and even those few are at the mercy of the court's discretion. There
remains no relief for the likes of Mrs. Sterling.
A Closer Look at the California Approach
In view of the issues raised by newly enacted section 851.8 of the
Penal Code and the holding in Loder v. Municipal Court,'38 California's
approach to the problem of arrest records deserves further analysis. In
this inquiry, attention will first be focused on the background of the
record sealing remedy in California. Then an attempt will be made to
assess the substantive right created by Penal Code section 851.8 and to
anticipate procedural considerations which will be important in giving
136. Id. § 11105.5. See note 28 supra.
137. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-1761 (Supp. 1976).
138. 17 Cal. 3d 859, 553 P.2d 624, 132 Cal. Reptr. 464 (1976). See text accom-
panying notes 106-13 supra.
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effect to the statute. Finally, the discussion will turn to the shortcom-
ings of the California approach, particularly the omission of any provi-
sion for relief for arrested persons against whom charges were never
filed or were subsequently dismissed.
A Background of the Sealing Remedy in California
Record sealing was introduced as a remedy for juvenile offenders
in the effort to ameliorate the handicap of a minor with a criminal
record."3 9 Under section 851.7 of the Penal Code, sealing is required
upon request to any minor arrested for a misdemeanor in cases where he
was later released, acquitted, or the charges were dismissed. 140  Sealing
is also available in cases where a minor convicted of a misdemeanor in
adult court finishes serving his sentence or successfully completes proba-
tion under Penal Code section 1203.45. Section 781 of the Welfare
and Institutions Code extends the remedy to a minor subjected to the
jurisdiction of the juvenile court upon a showing of rehabilitation five
years after termination of the court's jurisdiction, or when the minor
reaches the age of eighteen, so long as he has not been convicted of a
felony or misdemeanor involving moral turpitude. It is significant that
the courts were willing to expand the scope of these sealing statutes on
equal protection grounds, rejecting the exclusion of certain crimes from
the sealing remedy. 14  However, in T.N.G. v. Superior Court,42 the
supreme court rejected an argument that the imposition of a five year
waiting period before sealing under Welfare and Institutions Code
section 781, where no such requirement existed for minors tried in adult
court, violated the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment.
One of the most innovative extensions of the record sealing remedy
on equal protection grounds was the reasoning in McMahon v. Munici-
pal Court.'43 The case involved requests to seal the records of three
juveniles who were arrested for statutory rape but who were later
advised that no complaints would be filed against them. Penal Code
139. People v. Ryser, 40 Cal. App. 3d 1, 7, 114 Cal. Rptr. 668, 671 (1974).
140. Note that since the reduction of the age of majority to eighteen, the remedy
provided by Penal Code section 851.7 is available to a substantially smaller class be-
cause minors are seldom "arrested" for misdemeanors. The general practice is to sub-
ject minors to the jurisdiction of juvenile court in which case they are not deemed "ar-
rested." See T.N.G. v. Superior Ct., 4 Cal. 3d 767, 484 P.2d 981, 94 Cal. Rptr. 813
(1971); CAL. WELF. & INST'VS CODE § 625 (West Supp. 1976). See also CAL. Civ.
CODE § 25.1 (West Supp. 1976). But see CAL. PEN. CODE § 851.7(g) (West Supp.
1976).
14L. People v. Pruett, 51 Cal. App. 3d 329, 124 Cal. Rptr. 273 (1975), People v.
Ryser, 40 Cal. App. 3d 1, 114 Cal. Rptr. 668 (1974) (invalidating exclusions for nar-
cotics crimes).
142. 4 Cal. 3d 767, 484 P.2d 981, 94 Cal. Rptr. 813 (1971).
143. 6 Cal. App. 3d 194, 85 Cal. Rptr. 782 (1970).
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section 1203.45 provided for the sealing of records of misdemeanor
convictions after completion of sentence or probation, but made no
provision for sealing records of felony arrests followed by release or
dismissal. The court of appeal reasoned that if the defendants had
initially been arrested for statutory rape and burglary, but the rape
charges were dropped and the arrestees had been convicted of misde-
meanor burglary, they would have been entitled to petition for the
sealing of the entire arrest record. After exploring this hypothetical, the
court held that it could "find no rational basis for denying the right to
seek relief to a minor arrested for rape, but never formally charged." '144
The court then declared Penal Code section 1203.45 void insofar as it
excluded relief to juveniles arrested for felonies but not charged.
A recent case on expungement and record sealing is People v.
Municipal Court (Blumenshine),14 5 in which a person arrested for a
marijuana offense was subsequently discharged on the ground that there
was insufficient cause to believe him guilty of a public offense. The
municipal court granted the arrestee's motion to have all records, includ-
ing fingerprints and photographs, recovered and destroyed. The superi-
or court set aside the order and the court of appeal affirmed, holding
that the municipal court had no jurisdiction to order the destruction of
records. However, the court suggested that the municipal court would
have had the jurisdiction to order the arrest records sealed under Penal
Code section 1203.45 after a hearing on the merits.146 The case was
appealed to the California Supreme Court which initially granted a
hearing, but the cause was subsequently retransferred to the court of
appeal for reconsideration in light of footnote 12 in Loder v. Municipal
Court.' The Loder footnote refers to cases expanding juvenile record
sealing on equal protection grounds but notes that the limiting of the
remedy to juveniles was not a basis for an equal protection claim by
Loder. Inexplicably, the Blumenshine opinion did not specify whether
or not the arrestee was a juvenile,'48 but the retransfer of the case in
light of the Loder footnote indicates that this was most likely the case.
Considering the willingness of the courts to expand the record
sealing remedy under statutes applying to juveniles, it is conceivable that
an equal protection argument could be made for expanding the availa-
bility of relief for adults created by section 851.8 of the Penal Code. For
example, one could argue that an innocent person whose case is dis-
missed is denied the protection afforded a person who was tried, acquit-
144. Id. at 200, 85 Cal. Rptr. at 786.
145. 51 Cal. App. 3d 796, 124 Cal. Rptr. 484 (1975), petition for hearing granted,
S.F. 23390 (Sup. Ct., Nov. 25, 1975), cause retrans. Oct. 28, 1976, opinion filed not
for pub. (Cal. Ct. App., 1st Dist., Nov. 4, 1976).
146. Id. at 802, 124 Cal. Rptr. at 487.
147. 17 Cal. 3d 859, 871, 553 P.2d 624, 633, 132 Cal. Rptr. 464, 475 (1976).
148. Penal Code Section 1203.45 only applies to juveniles.
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ted, and able to establish his factual innocence. However, the chances
of succeeding in such an argument are admittedly negligible in view of
the position taken by the supreme court in Loder v. Municipal Court.
Notably, the court referred to the legislative history of Penal Code
section 851.8 as supporting its holding that judicial intervention was
unwarranted.
Tracing the history of section 851.8 of the Penal Code provides
some potential rights regarding the underlying purpose of this legisla-
tion. Senate Bill 299 was first introduced in January of 1975 as an
amendment to Penal Code section 851.7, which, as discussed above, 140
allows sealing of records of misdemeanor arrests of juveniles where there
was no conviction. The original bill 150 extended the remedy of sealing
to adults and applied to any offense where there had been a release,
dismissal, or acquittal. The arrestee could move to have all records of
the arrest sealed, but in the absence of such a motion, the court was
required to make the motion in his behalf. The bill also proposed that
the relief would be retroactive, thus applying to all prior cases where
there had been a release, dismissal, or acquittal, including records held
in California of arrests which had occurred in other states. A later
version of the bill was amended to limit the availability of the relief by
the provision, "Sealing shall not be ordered in any case unless the court
finds that the interests of justice so require, and that there is not a
preponderance of competent evidence establishing the guilt of the de-
fendant."'151 Subsequent revisions deleted all references to Penal Code
section 851.7 and limited the availability of sealing to cases of acquittal.
As finally enacted, Penal Code section 851.8 provides that records
may be ordered sealed following acquittal of a defendant who appeared
factually innocent to the trial judge. The court is not required to order
the records sealed if the acquitted person fails to make a motion for such
an order, although it may order sealing on its own motion. The trial
judge may deny the motion if he remains unconvinced of the defendant's
innocence. In enacting Penal Code section 851.8, the legislature has
created two critical areas of ambiguity: the scope of the substantive
right and the procedure by which this right is to be protected.
The Scope of the Substantive Right
The substantive right created by section 851.8 of the Penal Code is
the right of an accused to move for the sealing of all records following
acquittal of criminal charges. However, the right to relief conferred by
the statute is not absolute but conditional and permissive. The condi-
149. See note 140 & accompanying text supra.
150. S.B. 299, Cal. 1975-76 Reg. Sess. (1975).
151. S.B. 299, Cal. 1975-76 Reg. Sess. (as amended May 12, 1975).
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tion precedent to an acquitted defendant's right to have his record sealed
is that he appear factually innocent to the judge presiding at the trial.
Moreover, while the judge "may" grant the motion, he is not required to
do so. 15 12 The meaning of the prerequisite that the defendant appear
factually innocent thus becomes of critical importance, since the defend-
ant's right to relief is almost entirely left to the trial judge's discretion in
granting or denying the motion.
The factual innocence requirement poses a host of questions re-
garding the role of the trial judge. Assuming that a defendant was
acquitted by a jury, does the statutory provision requiring factual inno-
cence mean that the judge may deny the defendant's motion because he
disagrees with the jury's verdict? Such a situation could potentially
arise whenever the judge is inclined to disbelieve the testimony of
defense witnesses or the defendant or where the defendant does not take
the stand. A further problem presented by the factual innocence re-
quirement is the consideration that the judge may have knowledge of
evidence which was excluded from the trial, such as a confession ob-
tained without sufficient Miranda warnings or unconstitutionally seized
evidence. Inevitably, this suppressed evidence of possible guilt, if be-
lieved by the trial judge, will influence his opinion of whether or not the
defendant was factually innocent. Should a judge who is aware of
evidence tending to establish the guilt of the defendant be prevented
from considering it in determining whether to grant an order sealing the
defendant's records? An attempt to answer such questions provides a
means of delineating the boundaries of the substantive right of an
acquitted arrestee to have his records sealed.
In addition to the express requirement that the defendant appear
factually innocent of the charge, Penal Code section 851.8 makes a
further reference to innocence by the provision that a defendant who is
successful in moving to have his records sealed "may thereafter state
. . .that he was found innocent of such charge by the court."' 3  These
express references to innocence suggest a legislative intent to provide the
remedy of sealing only to persons who were mistakenly arrested and
prosecuted. An acquittal is not necessarily equivalent to a finding of
innocence, but really amounts to a finding that the prosecution has not
sufficiently proved its case beyond a reasonable doubt. An order
sealing the records of an acquitted arrestee, however, amounts to a
finding of innocence by the court. Since relief under Penal Code
section 851.8 is allowed only to individuals who appear factually inno-
cent rather than to all acquitted defendants, it may be reasonably
inferred that the trial judge's determination was intended to be made
from all the evidence at his disposal.
152. See text accompanying notes 137-38 supra.
153. CAL. PEN. CODE § 851.8 (West Supp. 1976) (emphasis added).
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Assuming that the judge may consider additional prosecution evi-
dence excluded from the trial, the question remains as to whether he
may also base his findings upon his personal disbelief of defense wit-
nesses or the failure of the defendant to take the stand. Since the
statute provides for sealing only when it "appears to the judge. . . that
the defendant was factually innocent,"' 54 it would seem that the court
would be acting properly in basing a decision not to order the record
sealed on its assessment of the credibility of defense witnesses. Evalua-
tion of the defendant's failure to testify would also seem appropriate, 155
as the fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimination would not be
applicable. 5" If a ruling may be made upon such considerations, the
crucial issue posed is whether, after his acquittal, the defendant moving
for a sealing order is entitled to present further evidence to establish his
innocence.
In addressing this question, it should be recalled that during the
trial, the prosecution has the burden of proving the defendant's guilt
beyond a reasonable doubt;' 5 7 the defendant has no burden of proving
his innocence and need not even testify on his own behalf. 5 8 However,
since section 851.8 of the Penal Code requires that the defendant appear
factually innocent, it is conceivable that the judge may be unwilling to
grant a motion for sealing in the absence of additional evidence tending
to establish the defendant's innocence, where such evidence was not
presented at the trial. It follows that the acquitted defendant should be
given the opportunity to present additional evidence.
Unlike expungement and sealing statutes of other states, Penal
Code section 851.8 does not expressly provide for a hearing in which
the state and the defendant would have the opportunity to present evi-
dence. However, authority for the proposition that a hearing is re-
quired may be found in the due process clause and considerations of
protecting the freedom to choose to exercise the fifth amendment priv-
ilege against self-incrimination.
To argue that Penal Code section 851.8 involves an interest subject
to due process considerations, it becomes necessary to distinguish this
right from the "reputation" interest denied constitutional protection in
Paul v. Davis.'5 ' There are essentially two grounds for the argument
that the record sealing opportunity provided in section 851.8 amounts to
a fundamental right within the scope of constitutional protection. The
154. CAL. PEN. CODE § 851.8 (West Supp. 1976).
155. E.g. CAL. Evw. CODE § 413 (West 1966).
156. See text accompanying note 201 infra.
157. See In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970); CAL. PEN. CODE § 1096 (West
1970).
158. U.S. CoNsT. amend. V; CAL. CoNsT. art. I, § 15 (West Supp. 1977).
159. 424 U.S. 693 (1976).
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first ground for such an argument is the distinction between the factual
and chronological contexts involved in Paul v. Davis and the California
statute. In Paul v. Davis, the plaintiff was seeking tort damages (rather
than sealing or expungement) for dissemination of arrest information
before final disposition of the charges against him. As has been recog-
nized by numerous decisions160 and codified by the Freedom of Infor-
mation Act,"' there is no constitutionally protected right of privacy of
arrest records in the period immediately following an arrest. Apart
from due process issues, the press is guaranteed absolute freedom by the
first amendment to report any facts pertinent to an arrest. In contrast
to this unprotected interest before final disposition of the charges, Penal
Code section 851.8 involves the interest in a sealing remedy to preserve
the privacy and liberty interests of an arrestee after acquittal.
The distinction between pre-exoneration and post-exoneration pri-
vacy interests has not failed to receive judicial recognition. The differ-
ence was initially delineated by a federal district court in United States v.
Kalish: 6 2
When arrested, an accused does not have a constitutional
right of privacy that outweighs the necessity of protecting society
and the accumulation of this data, no matter how mistaken the
arrest may have been.
However, when an accused is acquitted of the crime or when
he is discharged without conviction, no public good is accomplished
by the retention of criminal identification records. . . . His pri-
vacy and personal dignity is invaded as long as the Justice Depart-
ment retains "criminal" identification records, "criminal" arrest,
fingerprints and a rogue's gallery photograph.' 63
This distinction between pre-exoneration and post-exoneration interests
was also enunciated by the court of appeal for the state of Washington
which concluded that after exoneration there was a right of privacy
which was within the penumbra of constitutional protection:
We believe the right of an individual, absent a compelling showing
of necessity by the government, to the return of his fingerprints
and photographs, upon an acquittal, is a fundamental right im-
plicit in the concept of ordered liberty and that it is as well within
the penumbras of the specific guarantees of the Bill of Rights.164
Similarly, the Colorado supreme court considered the question of record
expungement after acquittal as "involving a constitutional right of the
highest magnitude-an individual's right to privacy."" 5 These exam-
160. See, e.g., Loder v. Municipal Ct., 17 Cal. 3d 851, 865 (1971).
161. 5 U.S.C. § 552 (1970), as amended (Supp. V, 1975).
162. 271 F. Supp. 968 (D.P.R. 1967). See text accompanying notes 58-59 supra.
163. 271 F. Supp. at 970 (emphasis added).
164. Eddy v. Moore, 5 Wash. App. 334, 345, 487 P.2d 211, 217 (1971) (citation
omitted and emphasis added).
165. Davidson v. Dill, 180 Colo. 123, 132, 503 P.2d 157, 162 (1972).
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ples of judicial recognition of a post-exoneration constitutional right to
privacy in cases directly addressing the arrest record problem (in the
absence of any statutory provisions for relief) suggest that an attempt to
distinguish Paul v. Davis on this ground is not altogether unreasonable.
However, it is obvious that to recognize the privacy interest of all
exonerated defendants as being constitutionally protected would have
dramatic ramifications and pose serious problems in the context of
existing law enforcement practices and record dissemination proce-
dures.
Notably, the decisions discussed above which found a post-exoner-
ation constitutional right to privacy did so as a means of affording relief
where there was no statutory provision. A possible second ground for
arguing that the record sealing opportunity provided by Penal Code
section 851.8 involves a constitutionally protected interest is the fact that
the interest involved, by being given special statutory recognition, has a
perceptively different status than the "reputation" interest in Paul v.
Davis. It is significant that in finding no "liberty" or "property" interest
to be given constitutional protection in Paul v. Davis, the Supreme Court
expressly noted that Kentucky law "does not extend to respondent any
legal guarantee of present enjoyment of reputation .. . ."' The
Court further noted that statutory recognition of an interest can bring it
within the protection afforded by the fourteenth amendment:
It is apparent from our decisions that there exist a variety of inter-
ests which are difficult of definition but are nevertheless compre-
hended within the meaning of either "liberty" or "property" as
meant in the Due Process Clause. These interests attain this con-
stitutional status by virtue of the fact that they have been initially
recognized and protected by state law, and we have repeatedly
ruled that the procedural guarantees of the Fourteenth Amendment
apply whenever the State seeks to remove or significantly alter that
status.'07
Thus the question posed is whether the "liberty" related privacy interest
furthered by California Penal Code section 851.8 may have attained
constitutional status by virtue of having been codified in a statute
providing a sealing remedy.
Admittedly, there are serious obstacles to be faced in asserting that
the interest codified by Penal Code section 851.8 is within the range of
interests protected by procedural due process. An initial hurdle to be
overcome in arguing that the statutory right afforded by Penal Code
section 851.8 is constitutionally protected is the observation that due
process safeguards have been invoked in connection with the revocation
of statutory "liberty" and "property" interests, rather than their initial
166. 424 U.S. 693, 711 (1976).
167. Id. at 710-11 (emphasis added).
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conferral.' 1 8  For example, in Goldberg v. Kelly,"1 9 the Supreme Court
held that the fourteenth amendment required a pre-termination eviden-
tiary hearing to afford the welfare recipient his due process right to be
heard before termination of his "property" interest in continuing to
receive welfare. In Morrissey v. Brewer,170 the question of due process
protection arose when the conditional grant of liberty to a parolee was to
be summarily revoked. In these cases, the procedural protections of the
fourteenth amendment applied to a subsequent loss of "property" or
"liberty" interests which had previously been conferred. 17' Thus it
becomes problematic to assert that fourteenth amendment due process
protections necessarily apply to require a hearing in the initial determi-
nation of whether to grant a sealing motion under Penal Code section
851.8.
Significantly, in at least one context, the California Supreme Court
has held that due process applies to a proceeding held to determine
whether a person will be granted an anticipatory interest. In In re
Sturm,171 a case concerning the rights of prison inmates in parole release
hearings, the court stated that some minimum incidents of due process
must be observed by the Adult Authority.' 73 Recognizing that the
presently enjoyed, albeit conditional, liberty interest of parolees facing
possible revocation is more substantial than a "mere anticipation or hope
of freedom," the court declined to impose all the procedures mandated
for revocation proceedings by Morrissey.171 Without explaining why
due process applied or expressly defining the anticipatory liberty interest
as being of constitutional dimension, however, the court opened the
door to expansion of procedural protections to situations involving the
grant or conferral of interests significantly affecting the individual.'
There is thus authority for the proposition that due process safeguards
168. An obvious explanation for the distinction adopted by the courts is found
in the wording of the fourteenth amendment: "nor shall any State deprive any person
of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law ... ".U.S. CONST. amend.
XIV (emphasis added).
169. 397 U.S. 254 (1970).
170. 408 U.S. 471 (1972).
171. Id. at 482. Footnote 8 in the court's opinion points out a cognizable distinc-
tion between the revocation of previously granted liberty and the anticipation of freedom
prior to release.
172. 11 Cal. 3d 258, 521 P.2d 97, 113 Cal. Rptr. 361 (1974).
173. Id. at 266, 521 P.2d at 102, 113 Cal. Rptr. at 366.
174. Id.
175. The United States Supreme Court recently granted certiorari to decide whether
due process applies in parole release hearings. After the death of one petitioner and
the parole of another, however, the case was remanded to the Sixth Circuit for consid-
eration of the question of mootness. Scott v. Kentucky Parole Bd., 429 U.S. 60 (1976).
For a list of cases from the federal courts of appeals on the issue, see the dissenting
opinion of Justice Stevens. Id. note 1.
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may be required in conferral situations, and the fact that the proposed
hearing under Penal Code section 851.8 would only involve the granting
of a statutory right is not necessarily a basis for rejecting the claim for
procedural due process.
The question of whether a non-tenured teacher had a due process
right to a hearing when his contract was not renewed was answered in
the negative by the United States Supreme Court in Board of Regents v.
Roth.1 8 In Roth, the Court noted that the state did not stigmatize or
defame Roth in the course of terminating his employment, the implica-
tion being that had it done so, Roth's constitutionally protected liberty
interests would have been infringed:
The State, in declining to rehire the respondent, did not make any
charge against him that might seriously damage his standing and
associations in his community ....
Similarly, there is no suggestion that the State, in declining
to re-employ the respondent, imposed on him a stigma or other
disability that foreclosed his freedom to take advantage of other
employment opportunities. 177
In Paul v. Davis,"8 the Court quoted the above language from Roth and
acknowledged that Roth could require a hearing on the issue of defama-
tion in such situations. A situation which would seemingly be within
the Roth hypothetical is present in the case of the denial of a section
851.8 motion. If it can be stated that in the course of seeking the
statutory right created by Penal Code section 851.8, an acquitted de-
fendant to whom the sealing remedy has been denied is left with an
unanswered "charge against him," then his due process rights are violat-
ed unless he has been granted a hearing on that "charge." This is true
despite the fact that neither defamation by the state nor denial of the
sealing remedy would independently invoke the protections of the due
process clause.'
A crucial factor in determining whether the defendant has been
stigmatized by the state is the consideration that the judge's failure to
make a finding of innocence and refusal to order the record sealed
amounts to an implied finding of guilt despite the verdict of not
guilty. 180 Thus the denial of a section 851.& motion leaves the acquit-
ted defendant with an arrest record amplified by an implied judicial
determination of guilt, which clearly could be viewed as a "charge
against him that might seriously damage his standing and associations in
176. 408 U.S. 564 (1972).
177. Id. at 573 (emphasis added).
178. 424 U.S. 693 (1976).
179. Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693 (1976); Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.s.
564 (1972).
180. See Comment, Criminal Procedure; Arrest Records, 7 PAc. L.J. 380, 381-82
(1975).
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his community." 8 ' When one considers the fact that an arrest record
alone subjects the arrestee to continued police scrutiny and may be
disseminated for purposes of employment and licensing by the FBI,'8 2 it
is clear that an arrest record coupled with an implied finding of guilt has
a greater potential for causing future disadvantages which is well within
the "stigma or other disability" criteria identified by Roth as invoking the
need for procedural safeguards under the fourteenth amendment. The
denial of a section 851.8 motion attaches a greater stigma to the defend-
ant than he would have had if he had made no motion; the acquitted
arrestee is left in a worse position than he would have been had the
statute never been enacted. In light of this effect, some type of minimal
hearing would seem to be required.
Apart from the fourteenth amendment, one may still find a
requirement for hearing based upon considerations of the potential
impairment of the freedom to exercise the fifth amendment privilege
against self-incrimination. A frequent problem in criminal prosecutions
is the practical inability of the defendant to take the stand in his own
behalf due to the existence of prior convictions which may be introduced
for impeachment purposes. Although the fifth amendment is violated
by any suggestion at the trial that guilt may be inferred from a failure to
testify, 183 it is likely that a judge may properly consider this factor in
deciding upon a section 851.8 motion. 4 If the defendant's opportuni-
ty to testify is confined to the trial itself, a decision not to take the stand
will be made at the cost of probably failing in a motion to seal the record
upon acquittal. Thus, the absence of any provision for a post-acquittal
hearing requires an individual facing trial to make a choice between the
exercise of his fifth amendment right and the potential statutory right to
an order sealing the record.
Constitutional problems may arise if Penal Code section 851.8 is
not interpreted so as to give a criminal defendant who chooses not to
take the stand a right to testify at a post-acquittal hearing. The
constitutional validity of an application of the statute so as to deny a
hearing may be questioned in light of United States v. Jackson,'s a case
involving the death penalty provision of the Federal Kidnapping Act.' s"
Under that statute, the death penalty could be imposed only upon a
jury's recommendation. Section 1201 of the Act thus "made the risk of
death the price of a jury trial"' 87 and imposed "an impermissible burden
181. Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. at 573.
182. See text accompanying notes 166-67 infra.
183. Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609 (1965).
184. See text accompanying notes 155-56 supra.
185. United States v. Jackson, 390 U.S. 570 (1967).
186. 18 U.S.C. § 1201 (a) (1970).
187. Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 746 (1970).
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upon the exercise of a constitutional right . "188 As the Court
subsequently noted:
Because the legitimate goal of limiting the death penalty to cases
in which a jury recommends it could be achieved without penal-
izing those defendants who plead not guilty and elect a jury trial,
the death penalty provision "needlessly penalize[d] the assertion
of a constitutional right" ... and was therefore unconstitu-
tional.' 8 9
Turning to the dilemma posed by Penal Code section 851.8, a
criminal defendant who does not testify at the trial will in all likelihood
be deprived of the statutory right to have his record sealed unless he is
provided with the opportunity to testify at a post-acquittal hearing. A
defendant intending to pursue the sealing remedy must choose between
testifying at the trial and, hopefully, presenting evidence establishing the
fact of his innocence in the mind of the trial judge, or asserting his fifth
amendment privilege not to take the stand. The decision not to testify
is thus made at the price of losing, as a practical matter, the statutory
sealing remedy. That a burden is thereby imposed on the nontestifying
defendant calls for further inquiry in light of the Jackson analysis. It
must be determined whether the burden is "impermissible," that is,
whether there are other methods of achieving the goals of Penal Code
section 851.8 without "needlessly penalizing" the exercise of the fifth
amendment privilege. The legislative history 9 ' and the plain language
of the statute' 9 ' evidence a purpose to confine the sealing remedy to
those arrested persons who were in fact innocent. This objective may
be accomplished without impairing the defendant's choice of exercising
his fifth amendment rights at the trial. A simple and obvious alterna-
tive is to provide a post-acquittal hearing at which time the defendant is
provided an opportunity to testify. Of course, if the defendant refuses
to testify again at this post-acquittal hearing, the judge could hold this
against him. Providing the defendant with an opportunity to testify
after acquittal will thus not impede the statutory goal of restricting the
sealing remedy to those who are innocent. This being the case, the
Jackson analysis indicates that an acquitted defendant who does not
testify at the trial must be given a chance to testify as to his innocence at
a post-acquittal hearing.'
9 2
188. United States v. Jackson, 390 U.S. 570, 572 (1967).
189. Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 746, quoting United States v. Jackson,
390 U.S. 570, 583.
190. See text accompanying notes 149-51 supra.
191. CAL. PEN. CODE § 851.8 (West Supp. 1976).
192. It may be argued that Jackson is distinguishable on its facts in that the death
penalty is a far greater burden than the mere loss of a statutory sealing remedy. Nev-
ertheless, the defendant's constitutional rights are compromised by the fact that he must
choose between asserting his fifth amendment privilege and obtaining the statutory rem-
edy.
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To recapitulate, section 851.8 of the California Penal Code serves
to protect against potential infringements of fundamental privacy and
liberty interests of innocent persons by a provision for ordering criminal
records sealed after acquittal. In the requirement that sealing be al-
lowed only to acquitted persons appearing factually innocent, the statute
creates a serious problem for defendants whose motions under the
statutq are denied, for the failure to obtain a sealing order implies a
judicial determination of guilt.'93 Although an acquitted defendant has
been provided an opportunity to establish a defense during his trial, it
may be argued that fourteenth amendment due process or fifth amend-
ment considerations require that a post-acquittal hearing be provided to
allow him the opportunity to present further evidence to establish his
innocence in order to obtain the benefit of the statute, especially where
the defendant, in the exercise of his fifth amendment privilege, chose not
to present such evidence in the course of the trial. The failure to
provide an acquitted defendant the opportunity to present additional
evidence would confine the trial judge to a consideration of evidence
presented at the trial and possibly other excluded prosecution evidence.
The lack of a full hearing on the issue may result in an unwarranted
denial of the defendant's motion for record sealing.
To afford some protection of the substantive right to have one's
records sealed, there must be some procedure by which the acquitted
person is guaranteed an opportunity to present any additional evidence
establishing his innocence. It is to the nature of this procedure that this
inquiry must now turn.
Procedural Considerations
In addressing the problem of what procedure must be afforded an
acquitted defendant moving to have his records sealed, it is necessary to
review the context in which such a motion would arise. Penal Code
section 851.8 provides that the motion to order records sealed may be
made by the court or any party in the case. Conceivably, the prosecu-
tion or the trial judge may make a motion under the statute, but it may
be safely assumed that in most cases the motion will be made by the ac-
quitted defendant. Thus, the procedural questions which arise concern
the rights of the exonerated defendant at a post-acquittal hearing, the
standards governing evidence and proof, and the possibility of appellate
review of the trial judge's decision on the motion.
193. The United States Supreme Court has held that "a statute creating a presump-
tion which operates to deny a fair opportunity to rebut it violates the due process clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment." Heiner v. Donnan, 285 U.S. 312, 329 (1932). The
potential application of this case to the arrest record problem was proposed in Com-
ment, Employment of "Criminal Record Victims" in Missouri: Restrictions and Reme-
dies, 41 Mo. L. REv. 349, 369 (1976).
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In determining the rights of the acquitted defendant, it is important
to recall that a post-acquittal hearing would take place after a trial on
the merits. The position of the exonerated accused would no longer be
that of a defendant facing criminal charges and possible imprisonment;
thus some of the constitutional rights guaranteed to an accused in a
criminal prosecution would probably no longer apply, these rights being
applicable only at trial or other critical stages of a prosecution.
194
Moreover, the hearing need not involve a presentation of all pertinent
information, because the trial judge would already be familiar with all of
the evidence presented at the trial, as well as other evidence held
inadmissible. Since the statute specifically provides that the motion is
to be decided by the judge who presided at the trial, it is clear that a
post-acquittal hearing cannot be viewed as a retrial on the merits.
Instead, the sole purpose of the hearing should be to enable the exoner-
ated defendant to provide any additional information not presented at
the trial, in the effort to establish the fact of his innocence. In view of
these factors, the post-acquittal hearing can reasonably be expected to
be more informal than a criminal trial. To determine the rights of the
exonerated defendant at this hearing, reference must be made to other
types of informal procedures.
The question of what minimum due process requirements govern
informal hearings was considered by the United States Supreme Court in
Morrissey v. Brewer.' 95  In Morrissey, the Court held that in parole
revocation hearings, minimum due process requirements included the
opportunity to be heard and to present witnesses and evidence, noting
that "the process should be flexible enough to consider evidence includ-
ing letters, affidavits, and other materials that would not be admissible
in an adversary criminal trial." '19 The Court also held that due process
required a written statement giving the reasons for the decision. While
the Court did not decide the question of whether there was a right to
counsel in Morrissey, this issue has been addressed in several subsequent
cases involving other types of informal proceedings, 197 and in California
the right to court-appointed counsel has been held applicable, on non-
constitutional grounds, to probation and parole revocation hearings. 198
These standards provide a useful starting point for considering what
procedures might be adopted for a post-acquittal hearing on a record
sealing motion.
194. See, e.g., Coleman v. Alabama, 399 U.S. 1 (1970) (preliminary hearing is
"critical stage" at which accused is entitled to an attorney).
195. 408 U.S. 471 (1972).
196. Id. at 489.
197. See, e.g., Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539 (1974); Gagnon v. Scarpelli,
411 U.S. 778 (1973).
198. See People v. Vickers, 8 Cal. 3d 451, 503 P.2d 1313, 105 Cal. Rptr. 305
(1972).
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Since the primary purpose of the hearing would be to allow the
acquitted person to provide information confirming his innocence, it is
logical to conclude that evidentiary rules should be relaxed so as to
enable the introduction of any exonerating evidence which may have
been inadmissible or unavailable at the trial as is done in other adminis-
trative or quasi-judicial proceedings. 199 This flexible approach to the
right to present evidence is particularly warranted by the consideration
that the judge is familiar with prosecution evidence held inadmissable.
Secondly, a strong argument can be made in support of a require-
ment that the trial judge state for the record the reasons for his decision
on the motion. Such a requirement ensures the possibility of review of
his decision.
Regarding the right to counsel, an important aspect of the post-
acquittal hearing is that it immediately follows the trial. Once the
verdict is in and the motion is made, the informal hearing is, in effect,
ready to begin.200 Since the defendant will usually have been represent-
ed by counsel at the trial, and since the motion under section 851.8 will
most probably be made by the defendant's attorney, it would seem
reasonable to allow the defendant to remain assisted by counsel. An-
other argument in support of a right to counsel is the consideration that
the hearing is likely to be an adversary proceeding, in which the
prosecution will be permitted to rebut new evidence, cross-examine new
witnesses and the defendant, and present incriminating evidence exclud-
ed at the trial. However, it must be remembered that the post-acquittal
hearing is not a retrial and the acquitted defendant is not jeopardized by
any subsequent proof of his guilt. Thus, the position of an acquitted
defendant is analogous to that of a plaintiff in a civil action for mali-
cious prosecution. Since the acquitted person is immune from further
prosecution, it is more likely that while he will be allowed to retain
counsel, the right to court-appointed counsel will not apply.
A final question regarding the rights of individuals in post-acquit-
tal hearings is whether the fifth amendment privilege against self-
incrimination will apply. Since the hearing contemplated is not a
199. See Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 489 (1972); In re Martinez, 1 Cal.
3d 641, 463 P.2d 734, 83 Cal. Rptr. 382 (1970) (exclusionary rule not applicable in
parole revocation proceedings).
200. However, it is possible that situations will arise in which there is a substantial
period of delay before the motion for record sealing is made, as in the case of written
motions upon discovery of new evidence or inadvertence of counsel in failing to make
the motion. The statute does not delineate any time period within which the motion
must be made, nor does it refer to the possibility of retroactive application. While
it is conceivable that a person acquitted prior to the enactment of Penal Code §
851.8 could avail himself of the statute, this possibility seems remote in the absence
of an express provision for retroactive application of the relief.
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criminal trial, and since the acquitted defendant does not face the
possibility of incriminating himself, there is no reason to believe the
privilege will apply.20' Thus the trial judge may be able to insist that
the acquitted defendant testify, since the purpose of the hearing is to
provide the judge with evidence sufficient to permit him to make a
finding of innocence.
Turning from the issue of individual rights to the hearing itself, key
questions for consideration include the burden of proof and the standard
to be applied in the determination of the defendant's factual innocence.
With regard to who has the burden of proof, it seems likely that the
exonerated defendant will have the primary responsibility of establishing
his innocence. Unlike a criminal case in which the prosecution must
prove the defendant's guilt, the purpose of the hearing is to give the
defendant an-opportunity to present additional exculpatory evidence.
Since there is no threat of further prosecution, it is arguable that the
presumption of innocence will no longer apply, and, like the plaintiff in
a civil action, the exonerated defendant must bear the burden of
proof.202
With regard to the issue of the standard which should govern the
judge's determination of factual innocence, it appears that a preponder-
ance of evidence test should be adopted. The hearing would not be at
all similar to cases in which, fraud or criminal guilt was alleged, and
there is no basis for imposing a higher standard than that governing
most civil actions. 3
In determining the reviewability of a decision under Penal Code
section 851.8, the first question to be answered is who may appeal the
decision. In the event that the motion is denied, the exonerated person
may base an appeal on the authority of Penal Code section 1237(2),
which provides that "[an appeal may be taken by the defendant . . .
[f]rom any order made after judgment, affecting the substantial rights of
the party.120 4  The fundamental right created by Penal Code section
851.8 is clearly affected by a denial of the motion, thus permitting
appeal of the order. Likewise, it is arguable that the prosecution could
appeal the decision allowing sealing as "[a]n order made after judg-
ment, affecting the substantial right of the people, '20 5 in that the
government has a substantial interest in maintaining arrest records, as
recognized in Loder v. Municipal Court.20 6 Assuming that a denial of a
201. See United States v. Calandra,.414 U.S. 338, 346 (1974).
202. E.g. CAL. EVID. CODE § 500 (West 1966).
203. See id. § 115.
204. CAL. PEN. CODE § 1237(2) (West 1970).
205. CAL. PEN. CODE § 1238(a)(5) (West Supp. 1976).
206. 17 Cal. 3d 859, 553 P.2d 624, 132 Cal. Rptr. 464 (1976).
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motion under Penal Code section 851.8 is subject to review, the final
question for consideration is the actual feasibility of appealing the
decision.
For purposes of appellate review, the trial court's findings of fact
are presumed to be correct, and the test on appeal is thus whether there
is any substantial evidence, direct or indirect, contradicted or uncontra-
dicted, which will support the finding.2 °7 While it is possible that the
transcript of the trial and the post-acquittal hearing may show the trial
judge's determination to be "so lacking in evidentiary support that a
reviewing court would be impelled to reverse it on appeal, 2 °s such a
result would be extremely rare. The trial judge who heard the criminal
trial and the post-acquittal evidence will probably seldom, if ever, be
reversed in his decision to grant or deny sealing of the record.200  The
legislative intent that the trial judge make the determination of inno-
cence is codified in the statute, and it is highly unlikely that an appellate
court confronting a cold record will be willing to disturb that finding of
fact.210
A post-acquittal hearing, however, would at least ensure that an
acquitted person would have an opportunity to be heard and present
evidence of his innocence prior to a decision affecting his substantive
right to have his record sealed. We now turn to the question of
innocent persons who lack any substantive right to sealing of arrest
records.
Shortcomings of the Statute: The Omission of Relief for Dismissals
As a response to the problem of the innocent arrestee, the primary
flaw in the legislative solution provided by Penal Code section 851.8 is
that it doesn't go far enough. The new statute provides the remedy of
record sealing for a limited class of adult arrestees who are actually tried
and acquitted and who are successful in satisfying the trial judge of their
factual innocence. Omitted from the statute is a provision to afford the
same protection to equally innocent persons whose arrests were followed
by dismissal of the charges.
207. People v. Walker, 32 Cal. App. 3d 897, 904, 108 Cal. Rptr. 548, 553 (1973).
See also People v. Bassett, 69 Cal. 2d 122, 138-39, 443 P.2d 777, 786-87, 70 Cal. Rptr.
193, 203-04 (1968).
208. Id.
209. It is conceivable that some cases of reversal would arise, as in instances in
which the true offender is subsequently apprehended and this new evidence establishes
the factual innocence of the exonerated defendant.
210. In addition, a court is not compelled to seal the record even if the exonerated
person is found factually innocent. Thus, reversal will occur only in the extreme un-
likelihood that a record exists showing that the court based its decision not to seal
solely on a refusal to find the exonerated person factually innocent, a finding for which
there is no substantial evidence. See text accompanying notes 137-38 supra.
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The failure of the legislature to extend relief to arrestees in cases of
dismissal was cited as a rationale for judicial inaction in Sterling v. City
of Oakland211 and Loder v. Municipal Court.12  In Sterling, the court
noted that a 1961 bill which would have provided for expungement of
arrest records was never enacted. The 1961 bill was only one of
numerous attempts .in the legislature to expand the class of persons
entitled to seek expungement of criminal records.21 3 One commentator
suggested that a major reason for the rejection of such legislative pro-
posals is the considerable cost and clerical difficulties which would be
involved in processing the number of cases in which the records could
be sealed.2 14 In Loder, the court viewed the omission of relief for
dismissals as indicative of legislative intent, commenting:
But legislative history strongly suggests the omission was delib-
erate. In these circumstances we should defer to the implied de-
termination of the lawmakers that the compelling state interests
identified hereinabove outweigh the speculative significance of a
dismissal "for lack of prosecution," a disposition which may be
predicated on many grounds other than factual innocence. 215
However, legislative omission of relief for dismissals was only one of the
reasons given by the court in holding that judicial intervention was
unwarranted. The court further held that the privacy interest of an
arrestee following dismissal was counter-balanced by the government's
interest in effective law enforcement and that in any event recent legisla-
tive and administrative action had decreased the potential for harm
posed by the retention of arrest records.2 16
As pointed out by the supreme court in Loder, the legislature has
enacted a number of statutes aimed at eliminating the danger of inaccu-
racy and improper use of arrest records. In the case of a person
arrested but released without being charged, Penal Code section 851.6
provides that all references to the arrest must be deleted and replaced by
the term "detention," and that notice of this disposition is forwarded to
all recipient agencies.21 7 To alleviate the problems resulting from in-
correct or incomplete records, statutory provisions have been made re-
quiring the dissemination of disposition reports to all agencies to which
arrest data was furnished, 1 8 and permitting the subject of a criminal
211. 208 Cal. App. 2d 1, 24 Cal. Rptr. 696 (1962).
212. 17 Cal. 3d 859, 553 P.2d 624, 132 Cal. Rptr. 464 (1976).
213. See generally Karabian, Record of Arrest: The Indelible Stain, 3 PAc. LJ.
20 (1972).
214. Comment, Guilt by Record, 1 CAL. WEsr L. REv. 126, 133-34 (1965).
215. Loder v. Municipal Ct., 17 Cal. 3d 859, 876, 553 P.2d 624, 636, 132 Cal.
Rptr. 464, 476 (1976).
216. Id. at 869, 553 P.2d at 631, 132 Cal. Rptr. at 471.
217. See CAL. PEN. CODE §§ 849.5, 851.6, 11115 (West Supp. 1976).
218. See id. §§ 11115-17.
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record to inspect the record and request corrections.2 19 To diminish the
use of arrest records outside the law enforcement context, legislation has
been enacted limiting dissemination to agencies with authorized access 220
and prohibitind denials of professional licenses22 1 or employment 222
based on the existence of an arrest record.
While these statutes evidence legislative concern for correcting a
number of the problems associated with arrest records, they leave an
arrestee whose records are not sealed vulnerable to future harm from
two sources. First, the FBI retains the arrest record in its files and
continues to have the authority to disseminate this information to banks
and to state and local governments "for purposes of employment and
licensing. '2 2 3  Secondly, the arrestee remains subject to continued police
scrutiny as a result of the retention of his records in police files. In
addition to the routine use of his mug shot and fingerprints in subse-
quent investigations of crimes of which the arrestee may have no knowl-
edge, the arrestee will find his arrest records to be a disadvantage to him
in various stages of the criminal process should he ever become entan-
gled in it again.224
In view of the remaining disadvantages which result from an arrest
record, a person who is innocent may understandably wish to have his
records sealed. However, under existing legislation, this remedy is
available only if an arrestee is acquitted following a trial. Thus an
innocent person against whom charges are brought but subsequently
dismissed is unable to seek the remedy, even if the basis for dismissal
was the prosecutor's decision not to prosecute after finding evidence
which fully exculpated the arrestee.
One possible strategy for obtaining record sealing might be for the
defendant to oppose the prosecution's motion to dismiss and insist upon
a trial. The rationale for such opposition would be that the dismissal
deprives the innocent defendant of the potential right to have his records
sealed which would be available to him if he were tried and acquitted.
The rule governing decisions on motions to dismiss is set out in Penal
Code section 1385 which provides that a judge may grant a motion to
dismiss "in the interests of justice." Prior to the enactment of section
851.8 of the Penal Code, it is unlikely that a defendant would have
opposed a dismissal on the grounds that it was contrary to the interests
of justice. However, in view of the potential right to seal arrest records
in the event of an acquittal, it could be argued that the interests of
219. See id. §§ 11120-26.
220. See id. §§ 11105, 11141-43.
221. See CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE §§ 461, 475, 480, 490 (West Supp. 1976).
222. See CAL. LABOR CODs § 432.7 (West Supp. 1976).
223. 28 C.F.R. § 50.12(a) (Supp. 1975).
224. See notes 18-21 & accompanying text supra.
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justice would be better served by a trial which would enable the accused
to prove his innocence, thus making him eligible for sealing. Given the
congested trial calendars of the criminal courts, such an argument might
understandably meet with a cool reception, although a receptive court
might accede to such a request.
In view of Loder v. Municipal Court,22 5 a judicial expansion of
relief to arrestees against whom charges were dismissed is not likely to
be reached in California in the near future. Existing legislation and the
supreme court's recent decision leave innocent persons like Mrs. Sterling
without recourse to the remedy of record sealing. While section 851.8
of the Penal Code affords relief to persons who obtain acquittals, it is an
ironic and unfortunate paradox of California law that the possibility of
record sealing is afforded only to the few persons who appear so guilty
that they are taken to trial.
Conclusion
Protecting the rights of the innocent has characteristically been a
fundamental concern in the administration of criminal justice. The
common law principle that an individual charged with commission of a
crime is presumed innocent until proven guilty exemplifies this concern.
Likewise, the requirement that guilt be proved beyond a reasonable
doubt in criminal trials operates to protect against the conviction and
incarceration of innocent individuals. By these and other procedural
and substantive rules, the rights of the innocent are safeguarded during
the course of the proceedings in which a defendant faces prosecution.
However, upon finally leaving the courtroom, an exonerated person may
find that certain rights have been left unprotected. Due to the existence
of an arrest record, an innocent individual may remain vulnerable to
unwarranted continued police scrutiny and investigation for other
crimes. Moreover, there is a lingering threat in the existence of such a
record in the files of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, which is
authorized to disseminate information outside the law enforcement con-
text.226
Although limited in scope, Penal Code section 851.8 represents a
significant step in the protection of the rights of the innocent in Califor-
nia. The new statutory provision for sealing records of acquitted de-
fendants who appear factually innocent serves to protect against poten-
tial hardships, for once a record is ordered sealed under Penal Code
section 851:8, the Bureau of Criminal Identification and Investigation is
required to "send notice of that fact to all officers and agencies that it
had previously notified of the arrest or other proceedings against the
225. 17 Cal. 3d 859, 553 P.2d 624, 132 Cal. Rptr. 464 (1976).
226. See note 223 & accompanying text supra.
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person. -2 2 7 If an acquitted defendant is provided a hearing in which to
offer additional evidence of his innocence, it is likely that most of the
eligible persons deserving relief under the statute will prevail in their
motions for record sealing.
There remains, however, a class of innocent persons for whom
there is no present legislative or judicial provision for protection. When
a prosecutor discovers evidence confirming the innocence of an arrested
person, the charges are usually dismissed. 228  In such cases, although
there may be overwhelming proof of the arrestee's innocence, the arres-
tee remains burdened with an arrest record. The provision for sealing
allowed by Penal Code section 851.8 applies only to defendants who
appeared so guilty that they were forced to undergo a trial. Thus, an
obviously innocent person has a negligible chance of obtaining relief;
instead he will join the ranks of dismissed arrestees like Mrs. Sterling for
whom an arrest record remains a lingering threat.
In Loder v. Municipal Court,229 the supreme court denied a re-
quest for erasure or return of arrest records following dismissal of
criminal charges. Although the relief sought was expungement rather
than sealing, the decision represents a major obstacle to expanding the
scope of Penal Code section 851.8. In Loder, the court concluded that
the multiple uses of arrest records within the criminal justice system
constituted a substantial government interest and noted that a dismissal
may be predicated on many grounds other than factual innocence. While
admittedly many cases are dismissed when the accused is not factually
innocent, the effect of Loder is to deny relief in cases of dismissal where
the arrested individual is innocent. The retention of arrest records for
all dismissals and the subsequent use of such records by law enforce-
ment agencies has the effect of "devising classifications that lump the
innocent with the guilty. '230 The purpose underlying the retention of
arrest records for use by law enforcement agencies is to promote public
safety; the retention of records of dismissals implies a presumption that
an unconvicted arrestee is an unconvicted criminal from which society
must be protected. 231  This presumption of innocence is thus aban-
doned when the arrestee leaves the courtroom and his records remain
unsealed.
To protect the rights of innocent persons after charges against them
have been dismissed, the record sealing remedy now available in cases of
227. CAL. PEN. CODE § 11105.5 (West Supp. 1976).
228. See, e.g., CAL. PEN. CODE § 1385 (West 1970).
229. 17 Cal. 3d 859, 553 P.2d 624, 132 Cal. Rptr. 464 (1976).
230. Menard v. Mitchell, 430 F.2d 486, 492 (D.C. Cir. 1970).
231. See Comment, Removing the Stigma of Arrest: The Courts, the Legislatures
and Unconvicted Arrestees, 47 WASH. L. REV. 659 (1972).
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acquittal should be expanded. As in the provision for sealing under
Penal Code section 851.8, such relief might be limited to cases in which
the trial judge is satisfied that the arrested person was "factually inno-
cent" of the charges. However, it is abundantly clear that some type of
provision for relief is long overdue to protect innocent persons following
dismissal of charges. The dilemma of Mrs. Sterling has gone unan-
swered for too long.
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